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PANEL II: Maurice Clarett’s Challenge 
 Moderator:  Jay Moyer* 
 Panelists:  Howard Ganz† 
  David Feher‡ 
  Gary Roberts§ 
  David Cornwell|| 
 
MR. KLEIN: Our second panel of the day deals with one of the 
most controversial court decisions affecting the sports world in 
recent history.1  Maurice Clarett has challenged the NFL’s rule 
barring any player from entering the draft until three years after his 
high school graduation.2  Because Judge Scheindlin in the 
Southern District of New York ruled in Clarett’s favor, Clarett, 
among others, will be eligible for this year’s draft.3 
This issue, however, is far from resolved.4  Just this week, the 
National Football League (“NFL”) and the NFL Players 
Association (“NFLPA”) began discussions to alter the collective 
bargaining agreement to include language prohibiting this type of 
early entry into the draft.5 
Our moderator for this panel is Professor Jay Moyer.  Professor 
Moyer was the National Football League’s first in-house attorney.  
 
 *  Professor, Fordham University School of Law 
†        Partner, Proskauer Rose LLP 
‡ Partner, Dewey Ballantine LLP 
§ Deputy Dean & Director of Sports Law Forum 
|| President, DNK Cornwell 
1 Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Clarett I], rev’d in 
part, vacated in part, remanded by Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) 
[hereinafter Clarett II]. 
 2 Id. at 382. 
 3 Id. at 410–11.  However, Judge Scheindlin’s ruling was overturned by the Second 
Circuit. See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124.  Therefore, Clarett was not, in fact, eligible for the 
2004 NFL draft. 
 4 As previously noted, the decision was overturned by the Second Circuit. See Clarett 
II, 369 F.3d at 124. 
 5 The 3-year rule is not currently part of the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement 
with the players’ association. See Chris Harry, Clarett, NFL Near Collision; Ohio State 
Star Sues for the Right to Be Drafted, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Sept. 24, 2003, at D1. 
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He was subsequently named the Executive Vice President and 
League Counsel by then-Commissioner Peter Rozelle.  Professor 
Moyer received his undergraduate degree at Dartmouth College 
and his law degree at Duke Law School.  I’m pleased to introduce 
Professor Jay Moyer. 
PROF. MOYER: Good morning. 
For those of you who have been on another planet for the last 
year or so, Maurice Clarett, star running back as a freshman at 
Ohio State University and member of that year’s national 
championship team when only two years out of high school, sued 
in the Southern District of New York to overturn the NFL’s draft 
eligibility rule, which requires that players be out of high school 
for at least three full football seasons before they may be eligible to 
be drafted.6  However, it’s a fundamental practice that no player 
ever comes into the NFL without being subject to a draft.7  That’s 
what makes the draft eligibility rule rather critical. 
On February 5, 2004, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District 
issued a long opinion granting summary judgment to Clarett on the 
grounds that the NFL’s eligibility rule violates Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and is not protected by the non-statutory labor 
exemption from antitrust laws.8 
I predict that you will find significant divisions of opinion on 
the panel here today, but I don’t think you will find anyone who 
will say that Judge Scheindlin got it all right.  The one thing she 
did get right in her opinion, for sure, was her observation that this 
case raised “serious questions arising at the intersection of labor 
law and antitrust law.”9 
In the next hour-plus, our purpose will be to explore the 
implication of this decision for the law and for the NFL, for 
college football and for young athletes, assuming the decision is 
 
 6 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382. 
 7 But see Mike O’Hara, Undrafted Doesn’t Mean Unwanted, DETROIT NEWS, May 31, 
2002, at 4H (“For the rookie free agents signed by the Lions after this year’s draft, the 
evidence is all around them that the draft is not the only way to make an NFL roster.  The 
Lions have 14 players on the 2002 roster who played for them last year and were not 
drafted by any NFL team . . . .”). 
 8 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393–411. 
 9 Id. at 382. 
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upheld on appeal,10 and to the extent possible, we will examine 
whether or not it will be upheld by the Second Circuit and, if it 
comes to that, by the United States Supreme Court.11 
We have a very distinguished panel today.  Going from my 
immediate left, we have David Cornwell of Newport Beach, 
California, who has a long history in a number of positions in 
professional sports; David Feher, a partner in the firm of Dewey 
Ballantine in New York; Howard Ganz, a partner in the firm of 
Proskauer Rose; and, on my far left, Professor Gary Roberts, who 
after cutting his teeth at Covington & Burling in Washington, a 
firm that has been a major legal player over the years in sports 
litigation, became Professor of Law at Tulane Law School and is 
widely known and widely quoted.  I won’t belabor their bios 
because you can read them in your materials. 
What we’ll try to do is have each panelist give his views, 
hopefully succinctly but as completely as possible, in a space of 
ten minutes or so, and then we will open it up to questions and to 
interplay between and among the panelists. 
I would like to ask Mr. Feher to begin this process.  David? 
MR. FEHER: Thank you, Jay. 
I want to start off by saying that because this case is currently 
pending, and also because my partner Jeff Kessler and I are regular 
outside counsel to the NFL Players Association and the NBA 
Players Association, nothing that I say today is being said on 
behalf of either of those entities, but, rather, is just my personal 
opinion. 
The other thing I want to say isthis relates more to me than 
to other folkssince we did represent the NFL Players 
Association in collective bargaining in these various matters, in 
terms of the facts as to what happened or did not happen, I am not 
going to comment on it at all because Judge Scheindlin did base 
her decision on various debates as to the facts and did reach certain 
 
 10 On appeal, the decision was reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. See 
Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 11 The United States Supreme Court denied Clarett’s application for certiorari. See 
Clarett v. NFL, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3231 (Apr. 22, 2004). 
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conclusions.12  So when we discuss the case, I am going to 
basically speak hypothetically but not testify in any way, shape, or 
form on that.  I don’t want to go in that direction. 
What Jay said, though, in terms of how this case relates to the 
intersection of labor laws and antitrust laws, that’s the nub of the 
issue inI was going to say in large part, but I think almost in its 
entirety.  Let me just lay a little bit of a background so that we all 
can have a common basis for at least the premise as to what 
happens when the antitrust laws and the labor laws are both at 
play.13 
Fundamentally, there is an inherent tension between the 
structure of the labor laws and the structure of the antitrust laws in 
that the antitrust laws are designed to ensure competition and 
competitive markets among the various participants14 and those 
antitrust laws have been in place for a long time, since the 
Sherman Antitrust Act15 enacted at the end of the 19th century. 
But at the same time, the federal labor laws are in many ways 
antithetical to free competition, in the sense that when labor and 
management were exercising their various choices and rights in the 
early 20th century, there was a lot of strife in this country.  Many 
workers believed that completely free competition among workers 
in the employment markets was not serving the workers especially 
well, and the workers fought long and hard for the right not to 
compete individually in the labor markets, but, rather, to 
collectively organize and to collectively bargain.16  The federal 
labor laws were enacted on the principle that workers can come 
 
 12 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 404–10. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a 
Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association?, 3 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 585, 592 (2001) (“There is a tension between antitrust and labor 
law, as the aim of antitrust law is to promote competition and discourage collective 
behavior, while the aim of labor law is to utilize collective activity to protect workers’ 
rights.  A series of judicial decisions has interpreted the legislation to alleviate this 
tension by providing a clear governing structure for determining how to protect both 
labor and competition.”). 
 15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004). 
 16 See generally FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Trade Unions in the United 
States (2004). 
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together and by majority decision form a union that will bargain on 
behalf of all of the employees in the bargaining unit and, in effect, 
take the place of any and all individual bargaining by the 
employees that would otherwise occur in the absence of a union.17 
This notion of collective bargaining once a union is 
formednot solely once the union is formed but as you get into 
the collective bargaining process and the various stepsdoes not 
permit individual decisions by employees to either accept or reject 
individual employment offers from employers in unionized 
industries. 
If you are an auto worker, where the United Auto Workers 
represents the employees in that industry, and you try to get a job 
with Ford, you cannot go to Ford and say, “Look, I don’t like the 
wage scale that the United Auto Workers has agreed upon with 
you, and I want to individually bargain with Mr. Bill Ford as to 
how much I should be paid.” 
Well, if you’re in the collective bargaining unit, under the 
federal labor laws, you have a collective bargaining representative 
and that collective bargaining representative has the exclusive 
authority to bargain in various areas with respect to mandatory 
subjects of bargainingwages, hours, and terms and conditions of 
employmentas well as other areas.18  Fundamentally, the union 
is the exclusive bargaining representative. 
That’s the backdrop as to how the labor laws are different than 
what applies when you have free competition. 
But a different question comes up because in certain industries 
they may not necessarily want a union.  From the entertainment-
sports perspective, because of supply and demand and how the 
industry is structured, for the employees in industries such as the 
NFL and the NBA, there are advantages to having free 
competition.  Employees in those industries have multi-
employers—it’s not all just one employer—and there are many 
teams that are operated, and we can get into debates about single 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 See generally FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Labor Relations (2004). 
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entities, which do negotiate for players individually.19  You don’t 
have the Jets negotiating for the Giants, or vice versa; each team is 
negotiating individually. 
And, since there is competition in those markets due to the way 
they have been structured, the players quite often feel that they 
would be better served by having competitive markets rather than 
having a wage scale.20  From time to time, whenever the union and 
management are in debates, there are discussions about cost 
certainty and all of this, but as a bottom line, the players, whom I 
represent, usually believe that competition is a good thing and it is 
better to have a system in place that ensures that the various teams 
in a given league compete for the services of players. 
Now, as a basic predicateand this gets into more nuanced 
questions from time to timeit is not always possible for the 
players to have a union and to agree with management that we 
have a collective bargaining agreement reached under labor laws, 
and that we’re all agreed that this is a fine system that should go 
forward. 
While everyone in a perfect world would always like to have a 
complete absence of disputes and no situations where an 
agreement is impossible, that doesn’t always happen.  It has 
happened from time to time in the NFL and the NBA where the 
players and the owners just could not reach agreement.21  And 
from time to time in those circumstances, the players have said, 
“Well, we need to have competition,” and the labor laws just are 
not working for the players in that circumstance. 
There was a long series of disputes and cases in terms of 
exactlylet me see if I can simplify this because this is a little bit 
 
 19 See, e.g., Barry Wilner, When Owners Get in the Way: Jerry Jones Isn’t the First—
and He Won’t Be the Last—Head of a Team to Venture into Areas Where He Simply 
Doesn’t Belong, FOOTBALL DIGEST, Feb. 2002 (discussing NFL team owners and how 
they sign players), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles-
/mi_m0FCL/is_6_31/ai_81789955. 
 20 See, e.g., NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. II § 3, available at 
http://www.nbpa.com/cba/articleII.html#section3 (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) (allowing 
players in their “individual contract negotiations” to “agree upon provisions . . . setting 
forth cash compensation.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Playing Hardball: Sports Labour Disputes, at http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-
41-1430/sports/sports_disputes/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
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complicatedbut whenever there is an agreement, certainly an 
agreement between the union and management on terms and 
conditions of employment, and that agreement is still in effect, 
there is something that is called the non-statutory labor exemption 
to the antirust laws.22 
Let me just give the starkest example.  We have a collective 
bargaining agreement in the NFL that says there is a salary cap.23  
That agreement is currently in place.  If a current player in the NFL 
says, “I don’t like the salary cap.  I want to file an antitrust suit 
against the salary cap that is in this agreement between the union 
and management,” the non-statutory labor exemption, which is 
something that courts have developed, dictates that he cannot file 
an antitrust suit.24  In order to permit the labor laws to function 
effectively in this circumstance and in order to uphold this 
collective bargaining agreement, antitrust suits may not be filed to 
challenge what has been agreed to between management and 
labor.25 
The Clarett case deals not with that particular circumstance but 
with a different issue.26  I won’t get into all of the details, but 
essentially Maurice Clarett isn’t a current player in the NFL; he’s a 
college player who wants to join the union and wants to join the 
NFL as a player.27  And so here we’re talking about a slightly 
different situation from the extreme: does the exemption apply to 
prohibit or not prohibit Mr. Clarett from filing an antitrust suit 
against the rules that the NFL has put in place with respect to the 
college draft?28 
The reason why we’re having this debate, is partly because of 
Mr. Clarett’s status, as he is not a current NFL player.29  If he were 
a current NFL player challenging any NFL rules in the collective 
bargaining agreement, it wouldn’t be an issue.  But there is a 
 
 22 See Fuhrman, supra note 14, at 593–97. 
 23 Id. at 592. 
 24 Id. at 593–97. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 27 See id. at 382. 
 28 See id. at 390–97. 
 29 See id. at 395–96. 
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factual question that Judge Scheindlin addressed: what is the status 
of the eligibility rules?30 
Undoubtedly, if you pick up the collective bargaining 
agreement in the NFL, there is no provision setting forth all the 
college eligibility rules.31  Rather, there are provisions that cross-
reference other matters.32  The NFL argues in Clarett that because 
of various cross-references and provisions as to what the NFLPA 
will or will not do in terms of supporting certain suits, the 
eligibility rules are effectively brought within the scope, such that 
it should be protected by this non-statutory labor exemption.33 
And so, in terms of the backdrop, we have the intersection 
between the labor laws and the antitrust laws and we have other 
cases that have arisen dealing with fairly clear circumstances 
where something is in a collective bargaining agreement and 
someone is challenging it. 
For example, there is a Leon Wood case34 that has been cited 
where a player who was coming into the NBA challenged the 
provisions of the salary cap as it applied to people who were 
entering the NBA.35  The Second Circuit in a clear opinion said 
that you cannot file an antitrust suit there.36  Here we have a salary 
cap agreement between the union and management, and even 
though you are entering the NBA, it doesn’t make a difference in 
terms of that provision being protected.37 
Clarett deals not with that precise question, but with someone 
who wants to enter the NFL and avoid application of a rule that is 
 
 30 See id. at 385–87, 396–97. 
 31 See id. at 385–87. 
 32 See id. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, arts. XVI–XVII 
[hereinafter NFL CBA], at http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=-
CBA+Complete (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (discussing selection and compensation of 
rookies, among other such matters relating to the draft). 
 33 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396–97. 
 34 Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. at 963 (explaining that the prohibition, in collective bargaining agreement 
between National Basketball Association and National Basketball Players Association, on 
player corporations could not be challenged on antitrust grounds). 
 37 See id. at 957. 
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not word-for-word contained within the collective bargaining 
agreement.38  So there are factual issues.39 
I know that history has been a bit complicated.  I hope that it 
has at least laid the basic framework for how we got to the 
litigation. 
I don’t want to go on too long, Jay.  If you want to have 
someone else describe what Judge Scheindlin actually decided and 
didn’t decide, that’s fine with me.  If you want me to go on, I can. 
PROF. MOYER: That’s a good suggestion, David.  For that 
purpose, I will turn to Professor Gary Roberts and turn him loose 
on this topic. 
PROF. ROBERTS: All right, Jay. 
Let me start off by saying that for the last twenty-one years I 
have taught sports law at Tulane, and I think if there is one thing I 
have learned, it’s that the term “sports law” is almost an 
oxymoron.  It seems that in so many instances when labor law 
cases or antitrust cases or contract cases, or whatever you have, 
come into a court of law or before an arbitrator, the judges, the 
arbitrators, and the jurors, because the cases involve sports, just go 
stark, raving nuts.  They start issuing opinions that are just flat-out 
stupid.  They don’t follow the law. 
The story we heard from the last panel, where the juror leaned 
over and gave Coach Bryant the glassesI’m not surprised at all 
by that, because it’s such a common phenomenon.40  The visibility, 
the passions, and the interest that sports stir causes courts to do 
really stupid things.41 
And Judge Scheindlin has continued the trend.  This case was 
one of the most abominable decisions I have ever seen.  I want to 
spend a little time going through it. 
 
 38 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379. 
 39 See id. 
 40 In the midst of the 1994 Major League Baseball strike, for example, a San Francisco 
judge cut Giants star Barry Bonds’ monthly family support payments in half and then 
asked Bonds for his autograph.  The judge subsequently withdrew from the case and 
reversed the decision. See Associated Press, Judge Makes Bonds Pay Full Family 
Support, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 1994, § 3, at 2. 
 41 See id. 
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Let me start off by saying that I’ve got tenure, so I can do this.  
I expect never to appear in front of this judge, hopefully at least not 
as a defendant. 
The rule in question is not one I’m particularly a fan of.42  In 
fact, if I were the czar of the NFL, I think I would probably have a 
different rule.  But I have to tell you, I’m not an expert on the 
game of football.  I don’t know at what age most players’ bodies 
become sufficiently developed so that they’re able to successfully 
compete in the NFL.43  I’m like most people, I’m a fan, and I have 
my own completely uninformed, prejudiced decisions and 
judgments; so I of course know the answer to everything.  I know 
what play the coach should run and what defense he should put on 
the field.  But the reality is I really don’t.  And so I’m not going to 
get into whether or not this is a good rule or a bad rule. 
My instinct—particularly as a faculty athletic representative of 
a Division One institution who would like to see all the Maurice 
Clarett’s out of our system so that he’s not taking his oral exams 
anymore—is to have these people go and play professional ball 
and leave college to real college students.44 
So having said that, I’m not a big fan of this rule and I wish the 
NFL would loosen up with it.  I also have to say that my opinion 
on that has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not it’s an 
antitrust violation.  And so, if you try to apply legal doctrine to this 
case, I think that you can go through Judge Scheindlin’s opinion 
and point by point show that she is just flat-out wrong.45 
In fact, this opinion is sort of right out of the 1960s.  Had she 
written this in the 1960s, I would have said, “Well okay, that’s a 
reasonable, plausible argument.”  But for those of you who know 
 
 42 See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. XII (“If four seasons have not elapsed since the 
player discontinued high school, he is ineligible for selection, but may apply to the 
Commissioner for special eligibility.”); see also Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385–87. 
 43 See Clarett I,  306 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (stating the NFL’s position that an athlete must 
be three years out of high school to be eligible to play in the league). 
 44 Cf. Mike Fish, Where is the Outrage, Feb. 3, 2003, at  http://sportsillustrated-
.cnn.com/inside_game/mike_fish/news/2003/02/03/straight_shooting (commenting on the 
inherent unfairness of allowing athletes to circumvent individual universities’ admissions 
standards). 
 45 See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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antitrust law, if you can see a district judge who starts citing as 
authority for her decision United States v. Topco Assocs.,46 Klor’s 
v. Broadway-Hale Department Stores,47 and a concurring opinion 
from a 1949 Second Circuit decision that was reversed by the 
Supreme Court,48 you know she’s in trouble.  Let’s go through 
some of the stuff that came out. 
First of all, Judge Scheindlin rejected the labor exemption.49  I 
want to just make a comment about David’s remarks, and I 
appreciate David’s walking through the background of the labor 
exemption.50  The one thing he left outand I know it’s because 
he and I disagree on this oneis whether or not you have to have 
union agreement in order for the non-statutory labor exemption to 
apply.51  This was a contentious issue from the early 1970s until 
1996.  The two different sides disagreed quite vehemently.  The 
cases evolved. 
But in 1996, by an 8-1 vote, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the non-statutory labor exemption applies to all matters 
that are mandatory subjects of bargaining, whether or not the union 
has agreed to them— the matters don’t have to be in a collective 
bargaining agreement in order for the non-statutory labor 
exemption to apply.52 
That was precisely the issue in the Brown case, which involved 
the NFL’s $1000-a-week salary cap on the developmental squad 
players.53  The union had never agreed to it.54  The League had 
proposed and unilaterally implemented the salary cap.55  The union 
was against it.56  Mr. Brown, who was one of the developmental 
 
 46 405 U.S. 596 (1972) 
 47 359 U.S. 207 (1957). 
 48 See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J., concurring). 
 49 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 50 See supra notes 14–39 and accompanying text. 
 51 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (observing that the non 
statutory labor exception is neither limited by case law nor principle to apply strictly to 
labor management agreements or labor management consents). 
 52 See id. at 250–51. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. at 234–35. 
 55 See id. at 234–35 (1996). 
 56 See id. at 234. 
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players, brought an antitrust suit.57  The case ultimately ended up 
in the Supreme Court after the District of Columbia Circuit 
decided 2-1 that it didn’t matter whether the union had agreed to 
the cap or not; if it’s a mandatory subject of bargaining, the 
remedy for members of the bargaining unit is through collective 
bargaining created by the labor laws and not through an antitrust 
court.58  How can you be bargaining in good faith if you’re out 
suing the guy on the other side of the bargaining table in the 
antitrust courts?59  That was essentially what the Supreme Court 
said in 1996.60  So it is really not relevant in Clarett whether or not 
the union had agreed to this “three years out of high school” rule or 
not.61 
Judge Scheindlin gave three reasons why the labor exemption 
did not apply.  Number one, she said that a provision setting entry 
requirements into the bargaining unit is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.62  I’ve created for purposes of trying to add a little 
levity to programs like this what I call my “stupidity assessment 
scale.”  It goes from one to five.  One is “I disagree with it but it’s 
not really stupid,” and there are different gradations up to five, 
which is “this is really phenomenally stupid.”  This one gets a five.  
I don’t think there is anybody on this panelin fact, I have not 
talked to anybody who is a labor lawyerwho would agree that 
entry requirements are not a mandatory subject of bargaining.63  So 
that reason is just gone. 
Second, she said that the exemption cannot bar someone who is 
not yet a member of the union from bringing a suit.64  Well, that’s 
just a fancy way of saying it’s not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining; if the union could agree to a provision that sets entry 
requirements, then that collective bargaining agreement is going to 
 
 57 See id. at 235.  In May 1990, 235 developmental squad players, including Mr. 
Brown, brought an antitrust suit against the NFL and its member clubs. Id. 
 58 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 
231 (1996) . 
 59 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 242. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 62 See id. at 391–95. 
 63 See Jeff Darlington, In the Balance, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Feb. 10, 2004, at D1. 
 64 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395–96. 
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apply to anyone who is or wants to become a member of the 
bargaining unit.65  The collective bargaining agreement doesn’t 
just apply to current members of the unit; it applies to prospective 
members of the unit, which is what Clarett is.66  So essentially, this 
second reason is just a rewording of “it’s not a mandatory subject 
of bargaining.”  So again, it’s not a very legitimate point. 
The third argument Judge Scheindlin made I have to say a little 
bit more about.67  In the third one, she said that for a rule to be 
protected by the labor exemption, it must arise out of the collective 
bargaining process.68  In other words, the rule has to be something 
that, for example, the union and management actually had 
discussed and management unilaterally implemented after impasse. 
There is language in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Supreme 
Court’s decision in 1996, from which you could make Judge 
Scheindlin’s third argument.69  And so I don’t think this one is 
completely off the wall.  It is quite clear that the NFL had the rule 
regarding eligibility requirements long before the union ever took 
any interest in it.70  In fact, it had a rule “four years out of high 
school” before we even had a union.71  So one could argue that this 
rule did not arise out of collective bargaining and that the language 
in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. means that the labor exemption 
shouldn’t apply.72 
I don’t think that’s a good argument and I would disagree with 
it, but I don’t think it’s completely off the wall.  The reason I don’t 
agree with it here is that it puts form over substance.73  The only 
reason the eligibility rule was not bargained over is because the 
 
 65 See Darlington, supra note 63. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). 
 70 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385; see also Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. 
McKinnon, Professional Football’s Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the 
Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 377 (1984) (tracing the origin of the Rule to 1925). 
 71 See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 70, at 377–78. 
 72 See Charles Lane, Clarett Lines Up against NFL, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at D6. 
 73 See id.; see also Lynn Zinser, Court Bars Clarett from Draft for Now, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 20, 2004, at D1. 
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union didn’t have any problem with it.74  In fact, Gene Upshaw has 
publicly stated he doesn’t have any problem with this rulein fact, 
he supports it.75 
So the fact that the union and the NFL didn’t argue over 
eligibility in collective bargaining is really meaningless.76  All this 
means is that the next time we have collective bargaining, the NFL 
is going to have to insist that Mr. Upshaw argue with them for a 
little bit before they agree on eligibility requirements.77  And if 
that’s what the law is, it’s kind of silly.  But that was Judge 
Scheindlin’s third reason for rejecting the non-statutory labor 
exemption.78 
So I think the non-statutory labor exemption ought to apply.  
The first two reasons Judge Scheindlin gave for why it did not 
apply were just dumb.  The third one is arguable, but I disagree 
with it. 
The next issue raised was the standing issue.79  On this one, I 
disagree with the NFL.  The NFL’s argument was that Clarett 
didn’t have standing because he wasn’t injured by reason of that 
which allegedly made the rule an antitrust violation.80  It’s a 
somewhat technical antitrust doctrine that I don’t want to 
particularly get into, but I think that it’s wrong. 
I think that the allegation ought to beand I’m not sure it 
wasthat what arguably made this illegal under the antitrust laws 
is that by excluding from the talent playing football in the National 
Football League a group of highly talented people, you are 
somehow diminishing the quality of the product on the field—you 
are keeping people off the field or off the court that the consumer 
wants to see, and that by excluding them from playing, you are 
 
 74 Todd Jones, Players Union against Early Entry, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2004, 
at 5F; see also Zinser, supra note 73. 
 75 See Darlington, supra note 63 (quoting Gene Upshaw as saying, “We will do 
everything in our power to block these young players from entering the league.”). 
 76 See Charles Lane & Mark Maske, Judge Rules NFL Draft Is Open to Everyone, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2004, at A1. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 79 See id. at 397–98. 
 80 Id. at 398. 
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diminishing the quality of the product—and product quality is one 
of those values that antitrust law is trying to promote. 
And so I think Clarett could make the argument that he is in 
fact injured by reason of a rule that creates this adverse effect on 
consumer welfare.  So I’m not sure I would have granted the 
NFL’s argument on the standing issue. 
But in the process of rejecting it, Judge Scheindlin didn’t just 
make the argument I made; she went on to say some things again 
that were just flat-out off the wall. 
For example, Judge Scheindlin says: Well, there were three 
older cases from back in the 1970sHaywood v. NBA,81 Boris v. 
United States Football League,82 and Linseman v. World Hockey 
Ass’n83where courts had found a per se violation of the antitrust 
laws against rules that are roughly equivalent to the one we are 
talking about here with respect to the NBA, the USFL, and the 
World Hockey Association.84  Judge Scheindlin said that because 
those courts ruled on the merit, presumably they must have been 
satisfied that the plaintiffs had standing.85 
I mean that’s just silly.  The defendants in those cases didn’t 
raise the standing issue; there’s nothing in the opinions that spoke 
to standing.86  To use that as some kind of precedent that standing 
exists is, I think, just crazy. 
Judge Scheindlin then cited Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale 
Department Stores,87 which is a case from 1959 that the Supreme 
Court has done everything short of expressly overruling.  She 
basically said: this is a group boycott, and therefore he has 
standing.88  Again, I don’t want to get into the details of group 
boycott doctrine, but there is not much left to it, and Klor’s is not a 
 
 81 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). 
 82 No. 83 CV 4980, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984). 
 83 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). 
 84 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390, 398. 
 85 See, e.g., id. at 398 n.119. 
 86 See id. 
 87 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
 88 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (holding that “group boycotts . . . have long 
been held in the forbidden category” and that Clarett’s exclusion was an “injury flowing 
directly from the anticompetitive effect of the Rule”). 
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viable case to be citing for much of anything anymore—yet that’s 
what she relied on.89 
I could go through several of the statements she made, but I’d 
rather focus on the antitrust issues. 
I disagree with Judge Scheindlin’s analysis under the antitrust 
laws for many reasons, but there are a couple mistakes she made 
that are just glaring. 
She held that summary judgment was appropriate.90  I am not 
convinced that if this case were to go to a rule of reason trial before 
a jury, that Clarett wouldn’t win.  I think that a jury could balance 
the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and ultimately 
conclude that the anticompetitive effects outweighed the 
procompetitive benefits.  My guess is, having not heard all the 
evidence and all the experts, that if I were a juror, I would 
probably not find that way, but I don’t know.  I’d want to hear the 
evidence before I reached that conclusion.  But for the judge to 
grant summary judgment is just goofy, because in order to do it she 
had to make a couple of findings that are just inconsistent with 
antitrust law today. 
First, on the finding of anticompetitive effects, instead of 
putting that issue to a jury, Judge Scheindlin declared that one 
could use the “quick look rule of reason” approach, which is 
certainly a doctrine that has been adopted by the Supreme Court in 
various cases, starting with Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma v. NCAA.91  She said that the anticompetitive effects 
were obvious, and the reason that they were obvious is because 
Clarett was being denied the opportunity to pursue his profession.92 
Well, that’s not an obvious anticompetitive effect.  There is 
language in the cases back in the 1950s and 1960s, when populist 
antitrust views were very common, that might agree.  However, 
 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. at 410–11. 
 91 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983); see Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08 (providing 
that a “quick look” analysis is appropriate where “the great likelihood of anticompetitive 
effects can easily be ascertained,” and “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would 
have an anticompetitive effect”). 
 92 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409–10. 
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since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has rewritten Section 1 
antitrust doctrine.93  The fact that an employee is somehow not 
allowed to ply his trade is not the kind of thing that antitrust law is 
interested in.94  Antitrust law is interested in consumer welfare; it’s 
not interested in the rights of employees.95  That’s why we have 
other laws, such as the labor laws.96 
So the mere fact that an employee is excluded from being able 
to work is not an antitrust issue.97  For Judge Scheindlin to say that 
just because Clarett can’t work means that there is an 
anticompetitive effect, and then to base summary judgment on this, 
is just wrong. 
Her support for this theory was a quotation from a concurring 
opinion in a 1949 case in the Second Circuit involving the baseball 
antitrust exemption (which six years later the Supreme Court 
rejected in the Toolson case98), in which Judge Hand basically said 
the right to work is an antitrust issue and that denying someone the 
right to work, in that case in the context of the baseball lifetime 
reserve system, was obviously anticompetitive.99  In 1949 I might 
have agreed with that analysis.  In 2004 it’s just absolutely wrong. 
But what really perturbs me is Judge Scheindlin’s response to 
the NFL’s procompetitive defense, in which she invokes an old 
doctrine that goes back four or five decades . . . .  The NFL’s 
procompetitive defense, which a jury should evaluate and balance 
against the anticompetitive effects, is that one of the reasons it has 
this rule is because if it doesn’t, a lot of kids who would be future 
NFL stars if they stayed in college and developed sufficient 
maturity, will now come out prematurely, they will try to become 
professionals before they are ready, and these kids will get eaten 
up and spit out and will never be able to develop into the quality of 
 
 93 See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 181–84 (3d ed. 2004). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that any challenge to an 
employer’s hiring criteria must “be founded on labor rather than antitrust law”) (citing 
Caldwell v. NBA, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 98 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
 99 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J., concurring). 
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NFL player that exists with the rule, and therefore in the long run 
the quality of the NFL’s product will be diminished.100 
Now, you might think that’s a silly argument; you might think 
that’s a good argument.  Like I said, I don’t really know because 
my opinion is only informed from watching games on Sunday 
afternoon.  But whether it’s a good view or a bad view is a factual 
issue, and it’s a factual issue that a jury has to decide. 
Judge Scheindlin got rid of that issue in this case by saying it’s 
irrelevant.101  The quality of the NFL’s product and the efficiency 
with which the NFL produces its product are irrelevant because the 
relevant market that is being benefited by this rule if the NFL is 
right is the product market, whereas Maurice Clarett is claiming 
that the anticompetitive effects are in the labor market, and you 
can’t use benefits in the product market if the claimed injury is in 
the labor market.102 
Judge Scheindlin cites Topco,103 which is one of the most 
vilified and ridiculed cases in the history of antitrust 
jurisprudenceevery court in the country no longer recognizes it 
as good lawand that’s her authority for this.104  It’s obviously not 
a correct statement on her part that the product market is irrelevant 
if the restraint is in the labor market. 
As an example, in the NCAA cases the courts are 
unanimousthe Supreme Court in the Board of Regents105 case 
said sothat with respect to restraints on players and all these 
amateurism rules, if you bring an antitrust suit alleging that the 
NCAA’s rules on the players are anticompetitive in the player 
labor market, these rules are nevertheless okay under the antitrust 
laws because the NCAA’s product is defined by the amateur nature 
of the activity, and therefore the benefit to consumers of having 
amateur college football played by real students is such a 
 
 100 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 101 See id. at 409–10. 
 102 See id. at 409. 
 103 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 104 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
 105 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
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procompetitive benefit in the product market that it overwhelms 
any anticompetitive effects in the player labor market.106 
I could name dozens of cases where since the mid-1970s the 
courts have said that you have to balance the totality of the 
competitive effects.107  About ten years ago in Sullivan v. NFL,108 
the First Circuit reversed another trial judge who ruled that you 
could only consider procompetitive effects in the market that the 
plaintiff claims has anticompetitive effects.109  This is just not the 
law. 
And yet, Judge Scheindlin invokes the old Topco case for her 
authority to grant summary judgment and take the procompetitive 
benefits issue away from the jury.110  That’s just wrong, and I don’t 
think there is any question about it. 
Finally, she turns to the less-restrictive alternative doctrine and 
says: Even if all of what I said before isn’t right, there is a less-
restrictive alternative in this case that the NFL could have 
employed without barring all people who were three years out of 
high school, and the less-restrictive alternative is that doctors could 
give players medical and mental examinations to see if they were 
ready to play in the NFL.111  I rest my case. 
PROF. MOYER: Gary, one could only have hoped that you 
would have told us what you really thought. 
MR. FEHER: By the way, Jay, I want my neutral description of 
the antitrust laws to not count against my time in responding to 
Gary. 
PROF. MOYER: Howard Ganz, what are you views on the 
topic? 
MR. GANZ: Although I usually agree 100 percent with Gary, I 
have perhaps a minor disagreement today, but I’ll get there slowly. 
 
 106 Id. at 133–34. 
 107 See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, 812 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1992) (“The Rule of 
Reason requires the judge to balance the anti-competitive evils of a practice against its 
procompetitive virtues.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1111–13 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
 111 Id. at 410. 
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First, just a couple of personal observations.  Discussing the 
Clarett case is for me a little bit of a “déjà vu all over again,” 
because when I was a junior—indeed very junior—associate at 
Proskauer, I had the privilege of working on the Haywood case.112 
My principal duty was to be the person who was sent to 
Washington to file a petition in opposition to a motion for a stay in 
the Supreme Court.  So that was my maiden voyage other than as 
an amicus, and my only voyage, to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  And it was not a successful one because Justice 
Douglas stayed the operation of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the 
NBA’s favor, and Mr. Haywood went on to a glorious NBA career 
notwithstanding his tender age.113  So Clarett sort of brings me 
back to the beginning. 
I would acknowledge, Gary, that the phrase “sports law” may 
be an oxymoron.114  I hope you don’t think “sports lawyer” is an 
oxymoron as well, but we’ll let that go. 
Like David Feher, today I am only presenting my personal 
opinions.  I don’t care if it’s adopted by the various players’ 
associations, although I doubt that it will be, and I have absolutely 
no knowledge of the facts, so I can say whatever it is that I want to 
say. 
First, with respect to where Clarett is at the moment, I think it 
is probably relevant to inform everybody that the NFL has made a 
motion to stay Judge Scheindlin’s decision.115  I think that 
argument is to be heard sometime next week by a panel that is to 
consist of Judge Feinberg; Judge Cabranes, who was actually on 
the panel in the NBA v. Williams case116 a few years ago; and 
Judge Pooler. 
If I were to put a wager on what will happen on the stay 
motion, I think the court will grant a stay, because the NFL has 
 
 112 Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). 
 113 Id. at 1207. 
 114 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 115 The NFL’s first motion for a stay was denied by Judge Scheindlin. See Clarett I, 306 
F. Supp. 2d at 411.  However, the Second Circuit reversed this decision on appeal. See 
Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124 (2d. Cir. 2004).  This appeal was heard by Circuit Judges Sack 
and Sotomayor and District Judge Kaplan, sitting by designation. See id at 124. 
 116 NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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proposed an expedited briefing schedule, that would enable the 
court to decide the merits in relatively short order.  Additionally, 
the NFL has represented to the court that if it should affirm Judge 
Scheindlin’s decision, the NFL would conduct a supplemental 
draft in which Mr. Clarett could be selected in plenty of time for 
him to attend training camp and/or to play next season.117 
I agree, more seriously, with Gary’s analysis of Judge 
Scheindlin’s opinion.118  Maybe a little bit on the lighter side of 
thatand recognizing that I am one who practices in the Southern 
District of New York and so therefore will be somewhat more 
restrained than Professor Roberts from Tulanebut Judge 
Scheindlin’s opinion is like virtually ever other opinion in a “sports 
law” case.  That is, it attempts to introduce some humor by using 
sports phrases or sports analogies, which 99.9 percent of the time 
fall flat: “the argument got close to success but failed to cross the 
goal line,” “they did not hit a home run with this contention,” 
etc.119  And for someone who has practiced in this area for some 
number of years, I don’t think I take it personally, but it seems, in 
my opinion, to sort of belittle the arguments that you’re making 
when courts and arbitrators utilize that kind of language. 
Judge Scheindlin actually took this to somewhat of an extreme 
by her repeated citations to such august legal authoritiesand I 
don’t mean to offend anyone in the audienceas espn.com.  In 
fact, the stay papers the NFL has filed make some issue of this 
because those citations suggest that the Court may have 
considered, and relied on, information that was outside the 
record.120 
Where I disagree, at least slightly with Garynot with the 
resultis that I think the subject of this rule, good or bad, is a 
mandatory, or should be found to be a mandatory subject of 
 
 117 See Dan Lewis, Clarett Clarification Causes Catastrophe? (Apr. 20, 2004) 
(acknowledging that any potential harm to Clarett would be lessened by the NFL’s 
agreement to hold a supplemental draft if the appeals court later ruled in his favor), 
http://www.footballproject.com/story.php?storyid=422. 
 118 See supra notes 44–111 and accompanying text. 
 119 See, e.g., Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (“This case has progressed rapidly, 
virtually rushing toward the goal line because of the imminence of the 2004 draft.”). 
 120 See id. at 386 n.33, 388 n.47. 
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collective bargaining, although this may not be an open-and-shut 
labor law issue.  There are NLRB decisions, and court opinions 
affirming them, which hold, for example, that the administration of 
pre-employment drug tests to applicants for employment is not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.121  And employers in virtually all 
industries other than professional sports would take the position, 
probably across the board, that they do not want and should not be 
required to bargain about how they treat applicants, or what the 
eligibility rules are, but would, instead, assert that matters like this 
are within a management’s prerogative. 
There are, of course, cases that suggest a different result.  One 
line of cases, on which the Wood decision in the Second Circuit 
relied, held that a hiring hall, where individuals seeking 
employment go to the hiring hall and then get referred out to 
employers, is clearly a mandatory subject of bargaining.122  There 
is an argument distinguishing hiring halls from a professional 
sports league draft because indeed hiring halls are common in 
industries where there are typically large or frequent layoffs of 
peoplee.g., the construction industryand where an employee is 
laid off, that employee can get back to work only by going to the 
hiring hall.123  So when the union and employer are discussing how 
 
 121 See Star Tribune v. Newspaper Guild of the Twin Cities, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 548 
(1989) (ruling that pre-employment drug testing, in and of itself, is not a mandatory 
subject of bargaining under the statutory duty to bargain about employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment). 
 122 See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing generally Local 357, 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B. 
409, enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966)).  
Collective agreements in a number of industries provided for the exclusive referral of 
workers by a hiring hall to particular employers at a specified wage.  The Wood court 
held that: 
[T]he choice of employer is governed by the rules of the hiring hall, not the 
preference of the individual worker.  There is nothing that prevents such 
agreements from providing that the employee either work for the designated 
employer at the stipulated wage or not be referred at that time.  Otherwise, a 
union might find it difficult to provide the requisite number of workers to 
employers.  Such an arrangement is functionally indistinguishable from the 
college draft. 
Id. 
 123 See id. (explaining hiring halls). 
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the hiring hall operates, it really has an effect, or potential effect, 
on a current employee.124 
All that being said, and while Judge Scheindlin tried to 
distinguish the Wood case principally on the ground that Mr. 
Clarett had not yet been drafted, I think that is a distinction without 
merit, to put it mildly.125  It can’t make a difference that on the day 
before the NFL draft, eligibility is not a mandatory subject, but as 
soon as the Commissioner announces that Maurice Clarett has 
been selected by Team X, eligibility became a mandatory subject.  
That just does not seem to be a logical conclusion. 
In addition, and certainly in other sports where there is an 
express provision in a collective bargaining agreement, Judge 
Scheindlin’s opinion really would eradicate rules to which the 
bargaining parties themselves have agreed.126  For example, there 
are age restrictions in the WNBA collective bargaining agreement, 
directly bargained across the table; the agreement between the 
WNBA and the Players Association says flat-out that you’ve got to 
be twenty-two years old to play in the WNBA.127  Under Judge 
Scheindlin’s opinion, those are pretty questionable provisions. 
I think that’s wrongthat when there has clearly been 
bargaining and the parties have agreed on issues like these, courts 
should not, and will not, have a problem. 
And I certainly agree with Gary that the fact that there is no 
explicit language on an issue in a collective bargaining agreement 
is not determinative.  Labor law acknowledges that by the practice 
of the parties over time, a course of conduct can emerge and 
become binding on the parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement.128  A classic example: If the employer for twenty years 
 
 124 See id. 
 125 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393–94 (distinguishing Wood, 809 F.2d 954). 
 126 See generally id. 
 127 See Kids in the NBA, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at C16 (providing that “[t]o be 
drafted for a WNBA team, a player must be 22 during the calendar year of the first 
season or graduated from a four-year college or have played at least two seasons in 
another pro basketball league.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 199 v. United Tel. Co. of 
Fla., 738 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an arbitrator’s award that 
appeared contrary to a collective bargaining agreement might nevertheless have been 
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has given Christmas turkeys to the workforce, taking away those 
turkeys may be a violation of the collective bargaining agreement 
even if that agreement says nothing about turkeys. 
So too in the NFL, these rules about eligibility have existed for 
quite some time, there has never been any objection from the 
union, and they should be regarded as a matter of practice as part 
of the overall collective bargaining agreement. 
In addition, there are social issues and business issues involved 
in rules like this.  By social issue I really don’t mean what Gary 
was saying about having a panel of doctors examining high school, 
junior high school, or elementary school athletes to see whether or 
not they are capable of playing a professional sportI’m not 
talking about whether or not the kids can play or whether or not the 
kids are mature enough to act in appropriate ways either on the 
court, or off the court.  There are plenty of examples of 
professional athletes in their thirties who have acted in rather 
childish ways—and I don’t think we need to make a long list of 
those—so I’m not sure age is a necessary factor.129 
But there are thousands of athletessome at college, some 
notwho, heartened by the ruling in Clarettand I think seven or 
eight high school players have declared themselves eligible for the 
NFL draftare going to give up the opportunity for an education 
to go to play a professional sport in which they are never going to 
succeed.130  For every one who makes it, there are thousands who 
don’t.131  Terminating the three season eligibility rule exacerbates 
the problem.132 
From a more parochial business side, i.e., from the League and 
teams’ point of viewand there may be some NBA draft picks 
 
valid if premised upon reliable evidence of the parties’ intent, such as past practices, 
industrial efficiency, and bargaining history). 
 129 But see Easterblogg, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Feb. 6, 2004) (“Performance in team 
sports requires maturity, which in this context usually means the early twenties.  Football 
is also the most complex of sports; it simply takes longer to learn.”), at 
http://tnr.com/easterbrook.mhtml?pid=1296. 
 130 See, e.g., Dick Vitale, High-School Stars Way Too High on NBA (Feb. 6, 2004), at  
http://espn.go.com/dickvitale/vcolumn040206-high-schoolers.html. 
 131 See id. 
 132 See id. 
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that reflect this because I think it is more important in sports like 
basketball where there is only a minimal number of draft 
choicesthere obviously have been a number of players who have 
been very successful coming out of high school and playing in the 
NBA.133  Putting aside his other problems, Kobe Bryant isn’t a bad 
basketball player and neither is Kevin Garnett, but for every 
Bryant and Garnett there are question marks.134 
At least from a very narrow business perspective, a team takes 
a large risk in investing one of its very few options to select draft 
choices by selecting someone who is eighteen or nineteen years 
old.135  They may win; they may lose.136  From the business 
perspective, it would be much better if that individual had more 
seasoning, whether in college or in some minor league, etc.137  
That is actually one of the reasons why the NBA started the 
National Basketball Development League, which has had some 
modest amount of success in providing call-ups to the NBA.138 
I think that, Jay, concludes what I would say for the moment. 
PROF. MOYER: Thank you, Howard. 
Let’s hear from David Cornwell. 
MR. CORNWELL: Thank you, Jay. 
I am going to, like Gary, take some specific shots at the 
Judge’s opinion. 
I actually think this is a fascinating case because it gives us the 
opportunity to get a glimpse at the impact that litigation tactics 
 
 133 See id. (“Let’s hope that some of these kids re-think and re-evaluate their futures.  
They can’t all be the next LeBron James.”). 
 134 See, e.g., Keith A. Owens, The Wags Try Kobe (July 30, 2003) (Despite Bryant’s 
success on the court, “he was the youngest player ever to join the NBA in 1996 at age 17.  
Now, at age 24, he may become one of the youngest to lose it all. . . . [He] has probably 
been caught up in too much of a whirlwind at far too young an age.  Being a sports hero, 
role model and husband has got to be one hell of a load to shoulder for a 19-year-old.”), 
at http://www.metrotimes.com/editorial/story.asp?id=5191. 
 135 See Vitale, supra note 130. 
 136 See id. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Nat’l Basketball Dev. League, 15 Former NBDL Players on 2004–05 NBA 
Opening Day Rosters (Nov. 2, 2004), at http://www.nba.com/nbdl/nbdl-
/nbdl_nba_openingroster_04.html. 
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have on the outcome of a case, as well as confirming that, in fact, 
there are times when judges are just flat-out wrong.139 
With respect to litigation tactics, I’m quite certain that there 
were good reasons the lawyers for the NFL and NFLPA decided 
not to issue a clarification to the collective bargaining agreement 
when it became clear that Maurice Clarett was going to challenge 
the draft eligibility rules.140 
The collective bargaining agreement in the NFL is also an 
element of a stipulated settlement agreement that came about in the 
resolution of a series of antitrust cases arising out of the labor 
dispute in the NFL in the late 1980s and early 1990s.141  Since the 
collective bargaining agreement was adopted, there have been a 
series of clarifications between the union and the league that, in my 
opinion, actually add new provisions—even though they are 
characterized as clarifications—and it seems to me that the parties 
could have clarified the eligibility rule here.  Had they, I don’t 
think that this case would have gotten much further, because in that 
instance it would have been a case of contract interpretation and 
not necessarily one that was susceptible to antitrust scrutiny. 
Additionally, I think that had they issued that clarification, the 
NFL would have done well to move the case to the District Court 
in Minneapolis because Judge Doty has a long history of dealing 
with these parties and disputes arising out of the collective 
bargaining agreement.142  I have been involved in disputes with the 
NFL and the NFLPA relating to interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement.143  My experience with Judge Doty is that 
 
 139 Judge Scheindlin’s ruling was overturned by the Second Circuit. See Clarett II, 369 
F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 140 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 141 For a brief summary of the antitrust cases, see Steven Wayne Hays, Labor Strife in 
the National Football League, Why the Reggie White Settlement Was Unfairly Settled for 
Those Involved and Why This Settlement Will Eventually Lead to More Problems, 13 U. 
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 195, 203–12 (1996). 
 142 Judge David S. Doty oversees the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement.  In 1992, 
Judge Doty paved the way for free agency in the NFL in overseeing a case finding the 
league’s free agent policies to be in violation of federal antitrust laws. See McNeil v. 
NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 143 Mr. Cornwell served as Assistant General Counsel for the NFL earlier in his career.  
In 1997, he co-founded DNK Cornwell, which specializes in complex transactions in the 
sports and entertainment industry. 
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when the NFL and the NFLPA agree on a provision, or on the 
interpretation of a provision in the collective bargaining 
agreement, he is unlikely to agree with a third party’s competing 
interpretation.144 
With respect to the Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, I think that the 
Judge got it wrong in a number of areas. 
First, I don’t think this case was susceptible to summary 
judgment.145  As we know, the standard for summary judgment is 
that there is no material fact relating to an issue in the case when 
all of the facts are construed in favor of the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment.146  Peter Ruocco, someone with 
whom Jay and I worked at the NFL, submitted a declaration in 
support of the NFL’s position where he stated that the eligibility 
rule was in fact the subject of collective bargaining.147  In rejecting 
the applicability of the non-statutory exemption, the court found 
that there was no evidence that the rule was addressed in collective 
bargaining.148  That means that Judge Scheindlin specifically 
rejected a factual assertion by a witness in the case without any 
finding that the factual statement was for some reason 
inadmissible.149  So in that regard, I think she is flat-out wrong. 
A couple of observations about the non-statutory exemption. 
The Judge even states in her opinion that the mandatory 
subjects are wages, hours, other conditions of employment, and 
those matters intimately related to the mandatory subjects of 
bargaining.150  I don’t know that there is any analysis, strained or 
otherwise, that supports the conclusion that if the draft is a subject 
of mandatory bargaining, eligibility for the draft wouldn’t also be a 
 
 144 Id. 
 145 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 146 See id. at 389. 
 147 Mr. Ruocco is the Senior Vice-President of Labor Relations of the NFL Management 
Council and was personally involved in the 1993 collective bargaining with the NFLPA. 
See id. at 383 n.4. 
 148 See id. at 396. 
 149 See id. 
 150 Id. at 392–93. 
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mandatory subject under her own language of “matters intimately 
related” to those subjects.151 
Howard noted the Judge’s effortI don’t even think it 
qualifies as being an effortto distinguish Wood.152  Wood stands 
for the proposition that in collective bargaining, a union may agree 
to provisions that have an impact on prospective members of the 
bargaining unit.153  You cannot find any language in Wood that 
supports the distinction that someone is not a prospective member 
pre-draft but is post-draft.154 
Similarly, the court cited a case, Caldwell v. American 
Basketball Ass’n, and attempted to distinguish that by saying: 
“Caldwell addresses a mandatory subject of bargaining—namely 
the conditions under which an employer may terminate an 
employee.”155  Here I think the distinction is of little difference.  If 
an employer can terminate an employee, or if termination is 
insulated from an antitrust challenge, then so too is a decision 
whether to hire an employee.  I don’t see it as a distinction that 
makes much of a difference. 
But one thing I do credit the Judge withand not so much the 
Judge, but it’s a conspiracy of events in my viewis that I think 
the decision holds up, to a certain degree, because of the absence 
of the NFLPA’s perspective and a definitive statement that the 
eligibility rule was, in fact, incorporated into the collective 
bargaining agreement.156  The NFL’s interests were laid out in the 
case, but there are clear interests that the union would have in 
agreeing to an eligibility rule, two of which come to mind readily. 
One is where an employer has access to less skilled, and 
therefore less expensive, employees, then a union has an interest in 
ensuring that those employees are required to meet certain 
qualifications, i.e., eligibility rules.  So in that instance, I think the 
NFLPA had an interest in agreeing to the eligibility rule. 
 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. at 393–94 (citing Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d. Cir. 1987). 
 153 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 960. 
 154 See id. 
 155 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 394–95 (citing Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 
66 F.3d 523, 529 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 156 See supra notes 26–39 and accompanying text. 
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A second would be if the union accepted, as I doI do believe 
that the rule is good because a substantial portion of my 
professional life is now spent dealing with and representing 
professional athletesthat it is fair to conclude that certain young 
men lack both the physical and psychological maturity to be 
successful in the NFL.157  I am hard pressed to embrace an 
argument that says these young men have the right to fail, and 
that’s what I think the challenge to the eligibility rule ultimately 
does.158  But if you accept the notion that young athletes are not 
physically mature enough, and ultimately are therefore susceptible 
to more injury, then the NFLPA has an interest in restricting those 
individuals’ access to the NFL because that would have a chilling 
effect on things such as benefits, injuries, and things of that 
nature.159 
One other observation, following on what Howard said: I was 
stunned when I read the opinion.  While I am as close to Michael 
Wilbon as somebody can be without actually being related, I was 
stunned to see that Judge Scheindlin actually cited Michael Wilbon 
in connection with this case.160  That is just simply 
inappropriate.161  I think that, in addition to being legally flawed, 
the decision is unprofessional as well. 
PROF. MOYER: Before we go to questions, do you want to 
counterpoint? 
MR. FEHER: I really haven’t discussed at all my personal 
views on the decision. 
 
 157 Many critics and professional scouts, for example, have expressed concerns about 
Maurice Clarett’s emotional maturity to play in the NFL. See, e.g., Sean Lahman, 
Clarett’s Behavior Raises Questions (Feb. 3, 2004), http://www.footballproject.com-
/story.php?storyid=415. 
 158 See, e.g., Paul Daugherty, Clarett’s Loss May Be His Gain (Apr. 20, 2004), at 
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/04/20/spt_sptfoot1daugherty.html. 
 159 See id. 
 160 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 n.54 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Michael 
Wilbon, For Clarett, It’s a Bad Move, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at D1).  In addition to 
writing as a columnist for the Washington Post, Mr. Wilbon co-hosts ESPN’s Pardon the 
Interruption with fellow Washington Post columnist Tony Kornheiser. 
 161 See generally John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427 (2002) (discussing the increasing use of 
non-legal materials in the High Court’s decisions). 
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MR. GANZ: That’s okay, David. 
MR. FEHER: You can tell that when Howie and I negotiate, 
we’re on opposite sides of the table.  When Gary and I have a 
dispute, it’s pretty much the same too. 
I want to look at this very carefully, though, because I think it 
is very easy—when you sometimes have an opinion where judges 
get interested in sports cases and use sports clichés and all of 
that—to totally dismiss it and say, “Oh, it’s just not right.”162  I 
don’t like that.  The judges succumb every now and then.  
Everyone’s a fan to some degree, I guess. 
But leaving that language aside, I think it’s important to 
analyze it very carefully, in terms of what the opinion says and 
what it doesn’t say, and also to break it out because I think Judge 
Scheindlin got large chunks of this right. 
On the antitrust law, I will say that Gary and I just 
fundamentally disagree on all sorts of subjects, and we have done 
this for years; there’s no reason to stop disagreeing now. 
But let’s look at it piece by piece and see what the judge found, 
what it’s based upon, and whether or not it makes sense. 
There are really two fundamental questions here.  The first is 
whether the non-statutory labor exemption applies or doesn’t 
apply, and then second, if it doesn’t apply, what are the antitrust 
merits?163 
Let’s start with the first part: Does the non-statutory labor 
exemption apply?  The facts that Judge Scheindlin found are not 
that the union and the employer agreed on these restrictions.164  Let 
me just go over factually what is uncontested and undisputed, and 
also what the judge found the effect was. 
If you look at the NFL collective bargaining agreement, there 
is what’s called a “non-suit” provision, which says that the NFLPA 
and its members will not file suit concerning the NFL constitution 
and by-laws.165 
 
 162 See supra notes 40–41, 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 163 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390–91. 
 164 See id. at 396–97. 
 165 See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. IV, § 2. 
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In terms of how that provision applies to Mr. Clarett, one 
interesting thing is that Maurice Clarett, since he hasn’t joined the 
NFL and actually hasn’t been drafted yet, isn’t a “member” of the 
NFLPA.166  If the definition of the membership of the NFLPA had 
been drafted differently, to not only include players who have been 
drafted but players who are seeking to be drafted, the NFL might 
have had a good and interesting argument that Mr. Clarett was 
barred by that agreement from even prosecuting the litigation in 
the first instance.167  But when you examine the collective 
bargaining agreement and see who it defines to be part of the unit, 
Mr. Clarett happens to be just outside that boundary.168 
PROF. MOYER: David, let me ask you one question.  What’s 
the scope of the NFLPA’s certification? 
MR. FEHER: Actually it’s interesting because the NFLPA 
gave up its status as a collective bargaining unit, and then they held 
that there was never a union that was certified, subject to a letter 
from the NLRB saying “this is the scope of your bargaining 
unit.”169  That sometimes happens with a union election, but there 
wasn’t a union election trigger here.  There were just consent 
forms that were distributed among the membership after the 
antitrust settlement was resolved, where the various union 
members agreed that they wanted to re-form the union.170 
And so, in terms of the scope of the union itself, the scope of 
the bargaining unit is defined on the first page of the collective 
bargaining agreement.171  I think that’s partly what got Mr. Clarett 
 
 166 See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See NFL CBA, supra note 32, Preamble (stating that the agreement covers present 
and future employee players, specifically: “1. All professional football players employed 
by a member club of the National Football League; 2. All professional football players 
who have been previously employed by a member club of the National Football League 
who are seeking employment with an NFL Club; 3. All rookie players once they are 
selected in the current year’s NFL College Draft; and 4. All undrafted rookie players 
once they commence negotiation with an NFL Club concerning employment as a 
player.”). 
 169 See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. Minn. 
1991). 
 170 See Jon Saraceno, NFL Players Prepare to Recertify as a Union, USA TODAY, Mar. 
5, 1993, at 11C. 
 171 See NFL CBA, supra note 32. 
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in the courthouse door in the first step.  He has argued in all the 
appellate papers that he is not a member of the NFLPA.172  So that 
gets to the first step. 
But then you get to the question of what was agreed to and 
what wasn’t agreed to.  As I said in the introduction, you can’t 
open up the CBA and find a section that says “eligibility 
requirements.”173  There are just these provisions that refer to non-
suits with respect to the constitution and bylaws.174 
And then, at the same time the CBA was agreed to, there was a 
letter agreement that was separately executed which simply says, 
“Attached hereto is the constitution and bylaws of the NFL that’s 
referred to in this other provision.”175  And so that letter agreement 
doesn’t say, “We agree to everything that’s in here;” it just says, 
“This is what’s cross-referenced in the other provision.”176 
And then, when you open up the provision of the constitution 
and bylaws of 1993, which is just cross-referenced, there is a 
provision relating to college eligibility.177  But those are the rules 
that were in place in 1993.178 
Judge Scheindlin said: Well, the reason why the NFL doesn’t 
get any benefit out of those rules is because by the time you got to 
Mr. Clarett, it wasn’t the same provisions, it wasn’t exactly the 
1993 provisions, and the rules restricting Mr. Clarett were actually 
just a memorandum unilaterally issued by Commissioner 
Tagliabue; therefore, it didn’t come within whatever protection 
might otherwise exist if the facts were different.179 
Now, I’m not going to get into the facts, but I will say that I do 
believe that it makes a fundamental difference as to whether or not 
a restriction that is imposed by a multi-employer bargaining group 
 
 172 Cf. Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Clarett, however, argues that the 
eligibility rules are an impermissible bargaining subject because they affect players 
outside of the union.”). 
 173 See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text. 
 174 See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. IV, §  2. 
 175 See, e.g., Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 128. 
 176 See id. 
 177 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385, 396 n.110 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 178 See id. at 385–86. 
 179 See id. at 386–87, 396. 
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or a group of employers is or is not agreed to by a union either 
directly or by incorporation by reference; there’s a fundamental 
difference under the labor laws as to what employers can do as part 
of the bargaining process and what they can do unilaterally on their 
own.180 
I’ll go one step further.  Let’s assume that Donald Trump 
wakes up tomorrow and decides, “I have enough money now so 
I’m going to resurrect my mistake with the United States Football 
League and I’m going to form a new league, and this league will 
compete against the NFL, and we’ll form this new league and we’ll 
structure it in a certain way.”181 
The NFL looks at this and says: I don’t like that, and so what I 
am going to do is to unilaterally decide . . . I don’t need to talk to 
Gene Upshaw or anyone else.  Commissioner Tagliabue wakes up 
on one of his bad days and says, “I’m going to unilaterally decide, 
and we’re going to issue a memo that says if any NFL team tries to 
hire any player who at any point in his life was employed by this 
competing league, they are forever barred from ever playing in the 
National Football League.  We’ve got to put these other guys out 
of business because we don’t want this competition.”  Now, that’s 
not something that’s agreed to by the union but unilaterally 
decided by the NFL. 
MR. GANZ: This is during the term of an agreement? 
MR. FEHER: Even during the term of an agreement. 
MR. GANZ: Even during, okay. 
MR. FEHER: During or in between.  But in any event 
MR. CORNWELL: He said he didn’t want to get into the 
details. 
MR. GANZ: I’m sorry. 
 
 180 See id. at 392–93. 
 181 See Thomas Neumann, Three and Out, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 16, 2003, at 
C1 (tracing the history of the USFL); see also Matt Winkeljohn, Ready to Rumble, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 2, 2002, at 1D (“The United States Football League was 
doing OK while playing in the spring, 1983–85.  But when New Jersey Generals owner 
Donald Trump persuaded fellow USFL owners to switch to a fall schedule opposite the 
NFL in 1986, it spelled doom.”). 
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MR. FEHER: This is a hypothetical. 
But looking at this hypothetical, if one of those aggrieved 
players said: “This is a classic group boycott.  I was previously 
employed in this other league.  Now I want to join the NFL.  This 
is a classic group boycott that flat-out bars me from participation in 
this league, not individually but because of my status, and that is a 
violation of the antitrust laws.”182 
Where does that stand in the spectrum of a labor dispute or 
something that should properly be the subject of an antitrust suit?  
This is a unilateral restriction imposed by somebody for 
anticompetitive reasons, not as part of the bargaining process, not 
as having anything to do with collective bargaining, but rather 
because of an intent to suppress competition on a particular 
marketand, indeed, more than one market.183 
The point I’m trying to make here is that the distinctions 
between the labor laws and the antitrust laws aren’t so broad and 
aren’t so clear-cut as Gary suggested when he said that according 
to the Supreme Court in Brown, the non-statutory labor exemption 
applies to labor matters even in the absence of an agreement.184  It 
doesn’t go that far.185 
What Brown really decided, I think, when you look at the text, 
is that when as part of collective bargaining the bargaining stops, 
impasse is reached, and management unilaterally implements 
something, which they are permitted affirmatively to do under the 
labor laws in the collective bargaining process—and that unilateral 
implementation is not distant in time or subject matter from what 
was being negotiated—then in that instance, the absence of union 
agreement wasn’t necessary for it to be exempt from antitrust 
attack because implementation after impasse is a part of the labor 
laws; if we’re going to have the labor laws operate, and that is 
something that is clearly recognized under the labor laws, you 
 
 182 Cf. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 398–405. 
 183 See id. 
 184 See supra notes 51–61 and accompanying text. 
 185 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237–39 (1996). 
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cannot have that exercise of labor law right by management as 
something that’s subject to antitrust attack.186 
That doesn’t mean the antitrust laws don’t apply.187  In fact, the 
Supreme Court expressly reserved the issue as to what happens if it 
is much more distant in time from the bargaining or if the union 
were to give up its status as a collective bargaining 
representative.188  Those are different issues. 
And so, while management might wish that the Brown decision 
decided that the antitrust laws are not relevant anymore to labor 
markets, they clearly are because it depends upon the factual 
circumstances in which it arises.189  The point here is that on the 
non-statutory labor exemption and the facts of this particular case, 
if one assumes the factual findings by the court that this was 
something never agreed to in collective bargaining and isn’t really 
part of the collective bargaining process, I think you have a very, 
very good argument that the antitrust laws can and should apply to 
factual circumstances that are divorced from union consent, union 
agreement, and bargaining in any sense.190 
The issue that Howard raised in terms of practice is an 
interesting one.191  That isn’t something that we’ve gotten into very 
much, and we can talk about it later.  But I don’t think that was the 
subject of Scheindlin’s opinion and it hasn’t been briefed so far.192 
Leaving aside the labor exemption, and if you get past the facts 
and say that because this doesn’t have anything to do with 
collective bargaining it was something that was unilaterally 
implemented, therefore the antitrust law should apply 
Before that though, there is a critical point that I think everyone 
is in agreement with—Judge Scheindlin’s observation that 
“Clarett’s eligibility was not the union’s to trade away.”193  My 
view is that the decision is completely incorrect.  If in the NBA or 
 
 186 See id. 
 187 See id. at 250. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See id. 
 190 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 191 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 192 See generally Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379. 
 193 See id. at 395–96. 
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the WNBA the union and management want to agree upon who 
can or cannot compete in the labor pool and who can or cannot end 
up being a member of the union, I think the labor law precedents 
are pretty clear that these issues can properly be the subject of 
union-management agreement, and in that instance would be 
protected from antitrust attack.194 
If you were an electricians’ union and you agreed with 
management that no one can come into the bargaining unit unless 
he or she has passed a certified test by an independent third party 
that he or she is competent to be an electrician, and somebody 
says, “Well no, I should be able to compete in this labor market 
and management can decide whether or not I’m a good enough 
electrician by how many people I kill in the first year,” I think that 
is properly a subject of bargaining and properly a subject of 
potential agreement between management and labor.195  And if 
they decide that you need to have a certificate to come in, then it is 
protected from antitrust attack.196 
And if in the future Gene Upshaw and Paul Tagliabue sat down 
and each put their signature on a piece of paper that says “no more 
college eligibility unless you meet these standards,” then that I 
think ends the matter, plain and simple, because I think it is 
something that can be agreed upon and can’t be subject to 
collateral attack under the antitrust laws if there is an express 
agreement.197 
On the antitrust laws, once you get past the labor exemption, 
you question: “If this is something that there isn’t any agreement 
on, should it survive antitrust attack?”198 
 
 194 See Darlington, supra note 63 (According to Gary Roberts, “If General Motors and 
the United Auto Workers wanted to reach an agreement that nobody can go to work until 
they’re 24 years old, they can do that . . . .  Employers and unions have these entry 
requirements and collective-bargaining agreements all the time.  It’s just so foolish she 
would rule otherwise.”). 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. 
 197 See Tony Grossi, NFL Awaits the Storm Clouds, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 6, 2004, at D1 
(“Even if S[c]heindlin’s decision is upheld on appeal, the league could amend its 
collective bargaining agreement with the players union to close the door just opened.”). 
 198 See Ron Borges, Clarett Ruled Eligible; NFL is Expected to Appeal Judge’s 
Decision,  BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2004, at E1. 
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First, although those cases relating to eligibility rules have been 
some time decidedthough those were the last time those rules 
were challengedthe last time I looked under the antitrust laws, a 
lot of doctrines that arose many years ago are still good law, 
including per se rules on price fixing and per se rules on classic 
group boycotts.199 
It is true that the Supreme Court in contexts outside of classic 
group boycotts has said that it has to be careful in terms of where 
the per se rule is going to apply, but FTC v. Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass’n 200 is a very recent Supreme Court decision . . . .  
When the participants in that labor market said flat-out, “We are 
not going to work anymore unless we have our wages 
raised”those were lawyers who were working for indigent 
clients who wanted to have their wages raised—the Supreme Court 
said that this was a classic group boycott.201  They didn’t use those 
exact words, but they said that it was subject to summary 
condemnation without a full-blown rule of reason analysis, and I 
actually believe it said that it was subject to per se condemnation 
as a clear classic group boycott.202 
The difficulty is whenever you are outside of a classic group 
boycott and you get into other circumstances where the facts are a 
little bit more mixedWhat are the motivations?  What are the 
interests?  Is this a cooperative venture in other ways?that’s a 
little bit different.203  But we’re not in one of those situations here 
because Mr. Clarett said that this is a classic group boycott in that 
the rules said “not just me” and it’s not just whether or not 
Clarettif this was a rule that said “Maurice Clarett can’t compete 
in this wage market,” then you properly get into the subject of 
injury to a competitor versus injury to competition.204 
But this is a rule that said “this entire class of potential 
participants in the labor market is excluded from competing in this 
 
 199 KINTNER ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 11.24 (per se rules on price fixing), 
48.14 (per se rules on classic group boycotts) (2004). 
 200 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 201 See id. at 431–32. 
 202 See id. 
 203 See id. at 432–36. 
 204 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98. 
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market.”205  The question as to whether or not it is subject to per se 
or “quick-look” review is a different matter.206  This isn’t an 
individual exclusion; this is a group exclusion.207 
I think the application of the “quick look,” or even the per se, 
whenever you have a naked restraint of tradei.e. where an entire 
class of potential market participants is not permitted to participate 
in that marketthat I think is something that is very easily 
susceptible to summary condemnation under either the per se or 
the “quick look.”208 
We’ve been talking about the NCAA cases.209  We’ve got a 
case that is currently pending where the NCAA passed a ruleand 
I know we all like the NCAA tournament in certain ways, but once 
upon a time the NCAA had competitors where other tournaments 
were out here, and indeed an even more prominent competitor, of 
which Fordham was a participant, the NIT, which was a much 
bigger tournament in the 1950s than the NCAA was.210  The 
NCAA didn’t like that and didn’t like the competition.  They 
passed a rule that said: if you’re invited to the NCAA tournament, 
you are not allowed to participate in any other post-season 
tournament.211  That is a flat, summary, exclusionary rule, a group 
boycott in its classic sense.212 
That is currently pending.213  We are in summary judgment 
arguments with the NCAA in terms of whether or not that is 
 
 205 See id. at 385–86. 
 206 See id. at 407–08. 
 207 See id. at 397–98. 
 208 See id. at 407–08. 
 209 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see 
also supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
 210 See Edward N. Matisik, NIT Sues NCAA under Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Feb. 4, 
2005), at http://www.collegehoopsnet.com/specials/050204.htm; see also Second 
Chances . . . But the NIT Offers Little More for NCAA, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 
15, 1990, at 6D (recounting the National Invitation Tournament’s illustrious past and its 
current status as a bridesmaid to the immensely popular NCAA Tournament). 
 211 See Melissa Isaacson, Road to the Rockies, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 1990, § 3, at 2. 
 212 See Metro Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment). 
 213 See Mark Alesia, NCAA Defends Tourney Bid Rules, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 16, 
2004, at 1D. 
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subject to either “quick look” or summary condemnation.214  And 
all sorts of issueswhat is the relevant market, what is the effect 
on competitionnone of that matters once you’re in a per se or 
“quick look.”215  And when you get into circumstances where you 
have flat-out naked restraints that are completely exclusionary on 
their face, it gets into a different mode of analysis.216 
And so while Judge Scheindlin’s language, I think, was not the 
best at times, when you look at the authorities that she cited, I 
actually think the antitrust analysis was not bad at all and follows 
some relatively standard case law in this area.217 
The only other thing I want to note is that in terms of whether 
or not it is okay to justify a restriction in one market by 
procompetitive benefits in another market, there are different 
circumstances when you are looking at vertical integration and a 
chain of distribution, and you’ve got dealers that are distributing a 
product.218  That is one circumstanceclearly vertical factors in a 
chain of distribution and a particular product—when you can look 
at intrabrand competition versus interbrand competition and how 
that should all apply in terms of the reasonableness of the restraint 
under the antitrust law.219 
It is a different situation when you are saying, “I am allowed to 
restrain competition in my input market, in terms of what I buy to 
 
 214 See generally id. 
 215 See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 407–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 216 See id. 
 217 See id. at 397–411; see also Damon Hack, Judge Orders N.F.L to Permit Young 
Athletes to Enter Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A1.  Robert A. McCormick, a law 
professor at Michigan State University who also worked on Clarett’s behalf in the case 
said, “She decided correctly that this is not the sort of thing exempted from antitrust law.” 
Id. 
 218 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 
19.03 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the history of Supreme Court decisions concerning 
vertical restraints on trade).  In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 
57–58 (1977), the Supreme Court held that nonprice vertical restrictions should be 
evaluated under the rule of reason, and that such restraints may be justified if they 
enhance interbrand competition between the manufacturer and its competitors, even if 
there is some loss in intrabrand competition among the manufacturer’s distributors. See 
id.  Eleven years later, the Supreme Court, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp 
Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 719 (1988), held that absent an express agreement on 
price, vertical restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason. See id. 
 219 See id. 
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create my product, in order to justify how well I can compete in 
my output market.”  If today any employerif GM said, “I’m 
going to be better able to compete in the automobile market if 
I”let’s say we don’t have a union hypothetically“if I agree 
with every other participant in the auto market to fix the wages of 
all the other employees in this wage market, and that restraint of 
trade is justifiable because I am going to be able to compete better 
in the output market”the antitrust laws do not go so far.  There 
are a lot more nuanced distinctions in terms of vertically integrated 
enterprises with intrabrand and interbrand competition, and 
whether or not these can serve as justifications.220  It’s completely 
exclusionary conduct in one market because that’s part of your 
input into a totally different market in which you’re competing.221 
I do not believe that the antitrust laws go nearly so far.  And 
while management and the producers of these entertainment 
products would like it to be so far, it is not so far right now. 
And so while I think it’s easy to take shots at Judge Scheindlin, 
other than her conclusion in terms of the NFL and NFLPA 
couldn’t agree on it, I actually think that a lot of the rest of it 
makes sense. 
PROF. MOYER: I’m sure that there are at least two, and 
possibly three, people on the panel who would just dearly love to 
respond to that and would disagree with it, but I’m not going to let 
that happen because we have a time problem. 
I will say this.  I think it’s clear from the views illustrated by 
Gary’s approach and by David’s approach that this case does test 
the limits of the so-called “modern” approach to antitrust, the 
school that emphasizes consumer welfare as the touchstone of 
violation or no violation, rather than the populist view that 
prevailed prior to the 1970s.222  We’re going to see, if this case 
keeps going and if the labor point is not the only point that gets 
 
 220 See id. 
 221 See id. 
 222 See VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 218, § 1.02 (In Northern Pacific Railway 
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court stated that the objective of the 
antitrust laws “rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces 
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress.”) (quoting Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 4). 
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decided, just how viable that old school that David Feher is talking 
about and embracing still is.223 
MR. FEHER: By the way, Jay, just to be fair, I am not old 
school. 
PROF. MOYER: Old is sometimes good. 
MR. FEHER: I am not old school.  I think everything I have 
said is perfectly compatible with the Chicago School. 
PROF. MOYER: Well, there are a lot of people on the Chicago 
School side who would disagree, and if we had another hour I 
would turn you guys loose and it would be fascinating. 
But let’s say this.  In terms of the progress of this case, there 
will come a point at which Maurice Clarett will be eligible for the 
draft and will enter the NFL.224  If this case has not been decided at 
the Second Circuit level, much less at the Supreme Court level, can 
this case be kept alive, or will it become moot—will it at some 
point no longer be a justiciable controversy?  Who has a view on 
that? 
MR. CORNWELL: I think it will be kept alive because he is 
not an individual defendant protecting his individual rights; he is 
protecting or seeking to protect the rights of a class.225  I think 
David made the observation about protecting impact on 
competitors as opposed to impact on competition.  So maybe it’s 
not Maurice Clarett’s name, but ultimately there are similarly 
situated individuals.226 
 
 223 See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 125 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (electing not to express an 
opinion on the district court’s conclusion that Clarett alleged a sufficient antitrust injury 
since they felt that that eligibility rules are indeed exempt from antitrust scrutiny under 
the non-statutory labor exemption). 
 224 The Court of Appeals did eventually reverse the opinion of the district court. See id. 
at 143.  Previous to that decision, the court granted a stay of the district court’s decision.  
As a result, Clarett remained ineligible for the 2004 NFL draft but will be eligible for the 
draft in 2005. See Warren DeLuca, Maurice Clarett, http://www.houstonprofootball.com-
/draft/prospects/clarettm.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 225 See, e.g., Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating the issue in the 
case as: “Should Clarett’s right to compete for a job in the NFL—the only serious pro 
football game in town—trump the NFL’s right to categorically exclude a class of players 
that the League has decided is not yet ready to play?”) (emphasis added). 
 226 For example, Mike Williams, a wide receiver out of U.S.C., entered the 2004 NFL 
draft following the district court’s opinion in the Clarett case.  This made Williams, as a 
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PROF. ROBERTS: Why would his lawyers continue to churn 
legal fees if he is already in the NFL?  His lawyers represent him, 
they don’t represent a class. 
MR. FEHER: You know, Gary, I actually can speak to this 
from a personal challenge I got at a prior symposium.  I was out at 
St. John’s the weekend after the Clarett decision came down with 
Alan Milstein.227  We reviewed this, and I said unequivocally that 
if Gene Upshaw and Paul Tagliabue were to agree to it, that would 
be the end of the matter.228  Mr. Milstein said, “David, if you do 
that, I will find another plaintiff and we will have another lawsuit.”  
At that point, I said, “Alan, you can make that argument, but I 
think under the labor laws you would lose.” 
PROF. ROBERTS: Unless he gets Judge Scheindlin, of course. 
MR. FEHER: I think under the labor laws, if there is such an 
agreementI mean, we’ll see what the Second Circuit says, but I 
think that on the point as to whether the union and management 
can agree, that was clearly wrong. 
PROF. MOYER: Speaking of the Second Circuit, we have in 
the Second Circuitso far as I know, he’s still alive and active and 
healthyJudge Ralph Winter.229 
MR. FEHER: That’s correct. 
PROF. MOYER: Judge Winter is a former professor of both 
labor law and antitrust law at the Yale Law School.230  He has been 
 
result of NCAA rules, ineligible to return to U.S.C.  After the Court of Appeals ruling to 
stay the district court’s opinion, and their subsequent reversal of that opinion in the 
Clarett case, Williams, like Clarett, was declared ineligible for the 2004 NFL draft.  Like 
Clarett, he will most likely participate in the draft in 2005. See Warren DeLuca, Mike 
Williams, http://www.houstonprofootball.com/draft/prospects/williamsm.html (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 227 Alan Milstein, of the New Jersey law firm Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & 
Podolsky, was Maurice Clarett’s attorney. 
 228 Gene Upshaw has been Executive Director of the NFLPA since June 1983. Gene 
Upshaw Biography, at http://www.manheimtouchdownclub.com/upshaw_bio.html (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2005).  Paul Tagliabue has been the NFL Commissioner since 1989. Paul 
Tagliabue, at http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nfl/comish/tagliabue.html (last updated 
Aug. 26, 2002). 
 229 See Yale Law School Faculty, Ralph K. Winter, at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside-
/html/faculty/rkw2/profile.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). 
 230 See id. 
PANEL 2 4/1/2005  5:55 PM 
2005] MAURICE CLARETT’S CHALLENGE 433 
on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals since 1982.231  My 
personal opinion is that if you could pick a single jurist in this 
country who knows the most about the question of the overlap and 
interrelationship between labor and antitrust, it would be Judge 
Winter.  He authored the Wood opinion that has been referred to, 
and several other very important opinions.232  I would suspect, 
without knowing of course, that if and when this case gets to a 
merits appeal in the Second Circuit, he will be on the panel.233  If 
he is on the panel, I would expect that he would write the opinion, 
and frankly I hope he does because I would tend to accept 
whatever Judge Winter might have to say in this circumstance. 
PROF. ROBERTS: And you know what he’ll say too, don’t 
you, Jay? 
PROF. MOYER: No, I’m not one hundred percent certain 
anymore, but I am reasonably certain. 
MR. FEHER: One thing I will note is that the Second Circuit 
does have random assignments, and so we will see. 
PROF. ROBERTS: Jay, can I just ask a question?  I have to ask 
David a question as to whether or not the NFL could adopt a rule 
excluding the class of convicted sports gamblers from playing in 
the NFL, or is that a per se illegal rule? 
MR. FEHER: A class of convicted sports gamblers? 
PROF. ROBERTS: Yes, all people who have been convicted of 
sports gambling and steroid use, let’s put it that way. 
MR. FEHER: I actually think that the current collective 
bargaining agreement largely addresses the subject.234 
PROF. ROBERTS: Forget the agreement.  There’s no union.  
You said under the antitrust laws if you exclude a class of people 
it’s per se illegal. 
MR. FEHER: No, I didn’t. 
 
 231 See id. 
 232 See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 233 Judges Sack, Sotomayor, and Kaplan actually sat on the panel in the Second Circuit 
decision.  Judge Winter was not present.  Judge Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 
court. See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 234 See NFL CBA, supra note 32, App. C, ¶ 15; id. art. XLIV, § 6. 
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PROF. ROBERTS: Or you can use “quick look.” 
MR. FEHER: No, I didn’t say any class.  It’s going to depend 
upon the circumstances of the rule and what it’s directed to. 
PROF. ROBERTS: That’s not what you said. 
MR. FEHER: But even under the per se rule, when you have a 
classic group boycott, you don’t just say, “You’re excluded.”  If 
you passed a rule that said you’re excluding two-year-olds from 
participating in the NFL, that, I would not argue, is something 
which would be struck down under the antitrust law. 
PROF. ROBERTS: Why?  What’s the difference between 
twenty-two and two? 
MR. FEHER: We could have a discussion about all of the 
group boycott cases that have occurred over the last twenty years, 
and you know as well as I do, Gary, that even the Supreme Court 
has said that the definition of classic group boycotts that are 
subject to per se condemnation and those that are subject to rule of 
reason is a matter that has created much confusion in the courts 
over the years.235  And you can do this.  You can argue by 
throwing something out“Well, where does this stand in the 
spectrum?” 
What I’m saying is there are certain things that are white, there 
are certain things that are black, even in application of the per se 
rule.  I think in this instance and also from a functional 
matterand the Supreme Court recently said thisthat we can 
have these tag lines, but ultimately what you look at is whether or 
not the court views it as an appropriate case for summary 
condemnation.  That is fundamentally the question. 
You can call it per se, you can call it “quick look.”  The 
Supreme Court has said that in some ways the labels don’t matter 
so much as whether or not it’s appropriate for summary 
condemnation.236  What I am saying here is that there are many 
categories in the NFL or in other sports where, if the owners tried 
to do something, it is more appropriate for it to be subject to 
 
 235 See, e.g., NW Wholesale Stationary, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 293–94 (1985). 
 236 See Cal. Dental Assoc. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–81 (1999). 
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summary condemnation in terms of its clear restriction on the labor 
market and not having any justification.237 
In terms of the application of the “quick look” to this particular 
case, I think there is a more than solid basis for saying—assuming 
the antitrust laws apply—that you can do this on a summary basis 
because the competitive effects of it are evident from the text of 
the rule itself and from the literal impact of the rule upon the 
market participants.238 
You don’t have to say, “Well, will these people be able to 
participate through these other means?”  You can look at the rule 
and say, “These people are going to be excluded from the market.”  
And if you look at excluding from the market a group of people 
who would otherwise be competing in the market and the 
anticompetitive effects it is going to have on the market, I think 
clearly it is going to have an effect on competition that you can 
read just from the terms of the rule itself.  How comfortable is the 
court in saying summary condemnation is fine? 
The Supreme Court did summary condemnation of the NCAA 
broadcast rules in Board of Regents.239  Clearly it did not think that 
a full-blown rule of reason was necessary.240  And you could say, 
“What if hypothetically it was somewhat different?” and you’d get 
out of that zone of comfort. 
But I think that Judge Scheindlin was comfortable.  Whether 
every judge would be comfortable we could argue a long time. 
PROF. MOYER: Gentlemen, I think we’re getting a little 
PROF. ROBERTS: I’m sorry I asked the question, but I have 
to say I couldn’t disagree more. 
PROF. MOYER: In any case, I think it’s about time we hear 
from the audience.  Anyone who has any questions, please so 
indicate.  Yes, sir? 
 
 237 See generally Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (analyzing the 
question of summary condemnation in terms justifiable restrictions on the labor market). 
 238 See supra notes 90–109 and accompanying text. 
 239 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 240 See id. 
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QUESTION: Not a question, just a comment.  I believe there is 
a case which is essentially Professor Roberts’ hypothetical, 
gambling under the antitrust laws’ gambling restrictions, which 
was Molinas v. NBA,241 where the court found that this did not 
violate the antitrust laws.242 
PROF. MOYER: That was in the good old days when judges 
could take a look at a fact situation and say, “Well, that’s 
reasonable,” and say so and make that the ground of decision.243 
PROF. ROBERTS: Of course, they could also say “that’s not 
reasonable” and cut the ground for decision, too.244 
PROF. MOYER: That’s true, too. 
PROF. ROBERTS: That’s the problem with it. 
QUESTIONER: I agree with David that everything should 
violate the antitrust laws. 
VOICE: That’s Chris Meyer from Weil Gotshal. 
VOICE: Unless the union agrees. 
PROF. MOYER: In the back? 
QUESTION: Three of the panelists raised policy issues related 
to age, like physical and psychological maturity, as to when 
athletes are ready to be professionals, when they should be able to 
forgo their childhood, their education, etc.245  I have a comment 
and a question. 
The question basically is what ever happened to free market 
choices and the choice of the individual? 
It was raised that the NBA teams take a huge risk in signing 
these young players.246  The point is if a player wants to pursue 
that type of employmentI mean, Maurice Clarett can choose to 
be a grocery bagger or to wipe windows on a skyscraper.247  If he 
 
 241 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
 242 See id. at 243. 
 243 Id. at 244. 
 244 Id. 
 245 See supra text accompanying notes 100–102 (Roberts), 129–138 (Ganz), 157–159 
(Cornwell). 
 246 See Chris Haft, Draft is High Risk, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 2, 1999, at D1. 
 247 Cf. id. 
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wants to try his hand at being a professional football player and 
there are teams out there that understand the risk that he is young 
and possibly immature, they can hire psychological experts and 
doctors to help them with that decision.248  If the teams are willing 
to take that risk, I don’t see why the NFL should be able to bar 
them from doing so.249 
I think another overall comment is that—kind of like what 
Gary Roberts was saying, with the Judge making kind of ridiculous 
rulings because these things are in the context of sports—I think 
that our reverence for sports creates some type of concept that the 
professional sports leagues, like the NFL or the NBA, are 
government entities that can make these rules on behalf of citizens’ 
rights.250 
Anyway, back to the age limitation, I wanted to hear some of 
the opinions of panelists who support the concept that maybe NFL 
players should be twenty-one or WNBA players should be twenty-
two, when you have other sports leagues—which some of you 
actually represent—that consistently hire sixteen-year-olds.  For 
example, Major League Soccer just signed a fourteen-year old.251  
The basic reason why they do that is so they can snag these guys 
into long-term contracts in order to sell them as commodities to a 
European club and make millions of dollars.252 
So where is the consistency between signing fourteen-year-old 
players and not being able to sign a twenty-one-year-old? 
PROF. ROBERTS: Is that a legal question?  That doesn’t 
really go to the legal issues of whether or not there is an antitrust 
violation.  That is just sort of your own “is this fair for Maurice?” 
comment. 
 
 248 Cf. id. 
 249 Cf. id. 
 250 See, e.g., What Should Baseball Do About Drugs?, at http://www.legalaffairs.org-
/webexclusive/debateclub_MLB1204.msp (Professors Gary Roberts and Paul Finkelman 
debate over steroid policy in Major League Baseball and allude to the power of the 
institution to set up laws restricting its use) (Dec. 13–16, 2004). 
 251 See Joe Burris, Child’s Play: More and More, Pro Arena is Becoming a Teen Scene, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 2004, at C17 (discussing teenage soccer sensation Freddy Adu 
of D.C. United). 
 252 See U.S. Soccer Scores Coup with Adu, SUNDAY MAIL, Nov. 23, 2003, at 70. 
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QUESTIONER: Well, you raised the age issue.  I believe three 
of you raised the age issue as a policy issue. 
PROF. ROBERTS: I didn’t. 
MR. FEHER: What I actually think is interesting is that the 
union and management can consider and debate all sorts of policy 
arguments that have nothing to do with competition.253  You know, 
Upshaw and Tagliabue just think it’s good from a public relations 
point of view not to have eighteen-year-olds in the NFL, and they 
can decide with very wide discretion that they think it’s not a good 
idea for the NFL and they’re going to agree to it in collective 
bargaining using all of these various safety policy issues.254 
But the Supreme Court has been clear that in antitrust analysis, 
you need to look at issues relating to competition; you can’t justify 
a restraint on the basis of public policy matters unrelated to 
competition.255 
And so, even if you think this is stupid and there ought to be a 
law, your remedy is to make a new law; it is not that the antitrust 
laws are repealed.  Absent some other agreement, the antitrust laws 
say you compete on the merits.256  The Supreme Court has called it 
this country’s “charter of economic liberty.”257  I believe that, and 
that’s what we need to keep in mind when we look at these 
decisions. 
MR. CORNWELL: That essentially begs the question, though.  
If it’s part of a collective bargaining agreement, then that begs the 
question as to whether it’s good policy.  I understand your 
 
 253 For some of the policy arguments raised by the panelists, see supra text 
accompanying notes 100–102 (Roberts), 129–138 (Ganz), 157–159 (Cornwell). 
 254 See Fuhrman, supra note 14, at 589. 
 255 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
220 (1993) (“By its terms, the Robinson-Patman Act condemns price discrimination only 
to the extent that it threatens to injure competition.  The availability of statutory 
defenses . . . confirms that Congress did not intend to outlaw price differences that result 
from or further the forces of competition.”). 
 256 See, e.g., id. at 223 (“As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a 
relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, 
and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial 
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting.”). 
 257 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
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perspective, but I disagree with it because I think you are largely 
the opponent of my position, which is that these kids have the right 
to fail.  I don’t think that’s a compelling argument. 
The overwhelming evidence, in the NFL at least, is that a 
substantial number of players who meet the eligibility 
requirements don’t last.258  We are likely to now find, if the 
Judge’s ruling is to stand, that a substantial number of them who 
don’t meet the eligibility requirement are also likely to fail.259 
I don’t think it’s a compelling argument to suggest that these 
young men have the right to fail, especially when you think about 
what goes on with “student” athletes at major football programs.  
They don’t spend a whole lot of time on the student part.260 
My view is that playing in the NFL should be a head start on 
the rest of your life, it should not be the end of it.  If you come in 
as a middle-rounder, and last “one and done,” one contract, the 
likelihood is that you are going to have difficulty finding gainful 
employment.261 
Now, I’m not quite sure what that young man won in being 
able to win that argument.  I think it’s a compelling policy reason 
to impose the eligibility requirement. 
PROF. ROBERTS: And there are all kinds of examples in our 
society where people have minimum requirements.  I know I was 
madder than hell I had to spend three years in law school.  I had a 
law firm that was ready to hire me after my first year, but by God 
the California people wouldn’t let me practice law until I got three 
years out of college and got a law degree. 
I mean, in every profession there are minimum requirements.  
You can question what they should be.  But the notion that any 
minimum requirement is somehow fundamentally unfair I just 
 
 258 See Pat Kirwan, Roll the Dice (June 19, 2002), at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com-
/inside_game/pat_kirwan/news/2002/06/19/rookies_looking_back. 
 259 Id. 
 260 See Steve Ganczaruk, Student Athletes Gravitate Toward Similar Degrees, at 
http://cronkitezine.asu.edu/spring2004/athletes.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) 
(documenting how college football players tend to have easier majors and lower 
graduation rates). 
 261 See Michael Voss, Life after Football No Picnic (May 16, 2004), at 
http://www.realfooty.theage.com.au/realfooty/articles/2004/05/15/1084570997324.html. 
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don’t accept.  The question is whether or not this is an appropriate 
minimum requirement in this case. 
PROF. MOYER: The policy question is what the question 
recognizes, and I think it’s fair to say that all of us up here would 
say whatever the policy is, if the NFL Players’ Association and the 
NFL Management Council agree on it, that’s the policy, and judges 
should stay the hell out of it. 
QUESTION: Just a further comment.  I think the reason why 
the age requirement and the eligibility requirement are as high as 
they are in the sports arena is because these are public figures and 
people want to idolize them.  But there are a lot of collective 
bargaining units that have age requirements.262  The construction 
workers’ union and the electrical workers’ unions, for example, 
have a lot of service requirements before you become a member of 
those unions.263  So sports are not unique in that respect.  It is 
consistent with a lot of other collective bargaining unions. 
MR. CORNWELL: Well, it is unique to a certain extent, 
because the compelling factor that makes us want to relax the 
eligibility rules is money, and not particularly being especially 
skilled.264  Now, if you are a child prodigy and you are ready to go 
to a law firm, maybe that’s a great argument.  But here, it’s not that 
he is particularly skilled, it’s just the draw of the money.265 
QUESTIONER: But an age requirement exists in many 
collective bargaining units. 
MR. FEHER: One thing I want to note is that I think it’s a little 
bit more of a “hot button” issue here because of some of the 
failures that have occurred in the NCAA, in the sense that in other 
industries quite often if you don’t satisfy one age requirement in a 
particular industry, you can go out and get another job in a related 
area or do something else and make a living.  These kids, as we all 
 
 262 See, e.g., Information Sheet for the Apprenticeship Training Program, at 
http://www.sheetmetallocal25.org/training/Apprentice%20App%20Instructions.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2005) (“Applicants must be at least 17 (seventeen) years of age and in 
good physical shape.”). 
 263 See id. 
 264 See John Gehring, Educators Troubled by NFL-Draft Ruling, EDUC. WK., Feb. 18, 
2004, at 3, available at http://www.usafootball.com/features/edWeek.html. 
 265 Id. 
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know from our idolatry of sports, are pursuing a dream, where a lot 
of them believe that sports is the way to get up and out in America, 
even though when you look at the numbers, the odds are incredibly 
long and hard.266 
If Maurice Clarett doesn’t go into the NFLhis problem was 
that back at Ohio State he was producing millions of dollars for 
that university and he was getting nothing, other than an 
“education.”267  But I think we’ve seen in the press what some of 
the examinations being provided to the University of Georgia 
basketball players were like: How many halves are there in a 
basketball game?268  How many points do you get for a three-point 
shot?269  I’m not joking about that. 
QUESTION: You have Georgetown, you have Virginia Tech, 
and they all have great 
PROF. ROBERTS: David, you better be careful.  You might 
get sued for defamation here. 
MR. FEHER: I am only stating things that I think are a matter 
of public record. 
And in terms of saying that there are issues in the NCAA, I 
think you only need to look at Ken Starr, for example, who was 
saying that he watches professional basketball a lot more than 
college basketball becauseI mean, Ken’s a conservative guy 
when it comes to markets generally, and he has terrible problems 
when it comes to the NCAA, and a lot of people do.  I think part of 
the reason why it’s a “hot button” issue is because a lot of these 
kids, if they don’t turn pro, are left in another market where they’re 
subject to market abuse. 
PROF. MOYER: Can we have one or two more questions, 
please? 
 
 266 See Kirwan, supra note 258. 
 267 See Dan Le Batard, Clarett’s Only Mistake—Not Taking More, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 
21, 2004, at 7D, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/sports/columnists-
/dan_le_batard/10237228.htm?1c. 
 268 See Steve Hummer, Old Dogs, New Principles, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 5, 2004, at 
1D (providing details of an extremely easy exam given to University of Georgia 
basketball players). 
 269 Id. 
PANEL II FORMAT 4/1/2005  5:55 PM 
442 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:391 
QUESTION: You say they are subject to market abuse because 
the odds are long.  You could say that about actors, models, artists, 
and many other entrepreneurs.  Ninety-eight percent of the SAG 
membership doesn’t work in any given year.270  So why is that 
relevant? 
MR. FEHER: People in that market operate in the market and 
you earn whatever you’re entitled to in a competitive market.  The 
difference is if you’re a student athlete in the NCAA, you can 
produce millions of dollars in earnings, but not for you. 
So, in effect, the NCAA has operated in various ways as a 
cartel, where they have passed rules that are commercially driven.  
Some of the rules are educationally driven, but they have passed a 
lot of rules that are commercially driven that, in effect, deprive 
student-athletes of the money they produce, in exchange for very 
little or nothing.271 
QUESTIONER: I’m thinking of the athlete who wants to come 
out. 
PROF. MOYER: We are getting way far afield now from our 
topic. 
Who has a question on this topic? 
QUESTION: I don’t know nearly as much about the labor 
exemption as any one of you, but my understanding of it is that the 
reason we have a criterionlike whether it’s a mandatory subject 
of collective bargaining, whether it was arm’s-length or notis 
because when the non-statutory labor exemption was crafted, it 
was a compromise.272  Courts did not want a total exemption 
because they recognized the possibility that there could be cases 
 
 270 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, Actors, 
Producers, and Directors (discussing the difficult employment prospects SAG members 
and other actors face), available at http://stats.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos093.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2005). 
 271 See Nathan Chaisson, Athletes Should Be Paid to Play, COLLEGIATE TIMES, at 
http://www.siue.edu/ALESTLE/library/SPRING2001/mar20/paidtoplay.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2005). 
 272 See Lacie Kaiser, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Sport Leagues, 2 DEPAUL 
J. SPORTS L. &  CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 22 (2004). 
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where labor combined with management to be exclusionary, to do 
things that might violate antitrust law.273 
I wonder if that’s a possibility here.  I’m thinking about the 
New England Patriots.  They have been very adroit at getting rid of 
older players and getting younger players to replace them.274  I 
wonder if Lawyer Malloy and Ty Law and those guys, if they go to 
their union and they discuss Maurice Clarett, where are these guys 
going to come down?275  Wouldn’t it be in their interest to keep the 
Maurice Claretts out of the NFL?  Isn’t it possible that it’s in the 
interest of the NFL Players’ Association as well as the NFL to join 
together and exclude these younger players? 
MR. GANZ: Sure, it may be, but it is certainly not unusual for 
a typical bargaining agreement to disadvantage prospective and 
recently hired employees.276  They are put on probation, their 
salaries are lower, etc.,—even in professional sports.277  In the 
NBA, for example, there is a rookie scale: If you are drafted in the 
twenty-third pick in the first round, you get X dollars this year, X+ 
in year two, and X++ in year three, period.278  Whether you’re 
LeBron James or anybody else, you can’t make as much money as 
a team might be willing to pay you.279  That was something that 
was supported very enthusiastically by the union and veteran 
players because it allowed more money to go to the veteran 
players.280  That’s what unions do.  They protect the current, the 
living, in preference to the unborn. 
MR. CORNWELL: The language from the decision even notes 
that.  It says: “‘Newcomers in the industrial context routinely find 
 
 273 Id. 
 274 See Ian Logue, Pats Start Preparing for Eagles, at http://www.patsfans.com-
/stories/display_story.php?story_id=2460 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
 275 Law and Milloy played together for the New England Patriots from 1996–2002 and 
are members of the NFLPA. See Lawyer Milloy, at http://www.nfl.com/players-
/playerpage/3965 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005); Ty Law, at http://www.nfl.com/players-
/playerpage/3820 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 276 See, e.g., NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VIII [hereinafter NBA CBA], 
available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba/cba.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 277 See id. 
 278 See id. 
 279 See id. 
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themselves disadvantaged vis-à-vis those already hired. . . . that is 
[] a commonplace consequence of collective agreements.’”281  But 
then it continues: “Clarett’s eligibility was not the union’s to trade 
away.”282 
Judge Scheindlin gives but then completely departs from the 
rationale that supports that non-members are routinely 
disadvantaged by a collective bargaining agreement.283  In essence, 
the language and the rationale she cites do not support the 
conclusion that she reaches.284 
Also along the lines of your observation, the union and the 
NFL agreed to give teams relief under the salary cap with respect 
to minimum salaries to ensure that older, veteran players would 
still be employable, as opposed to a team just going to the younger 
player for whom a lower minimum salary applied.285  So even in 
that instance they took steps to protect the interests of the older 
players.286 
PROF. MOYER: In other words, it happens routinely. 
There is one more question over here, please. 
QUESTION: I just want to be clear about certain things that I 
thought I heard from everyone.  Is Clarett being excluded solely on 
the basis of his age or the number of years that he has been out of 
high school? 
PROF. MOYER: The latter.287 
QUESTIONER: If so, that doesn’t relate to any building up of 
him as a person or an individual.  It’s just a time period exclusion, 
it seems to me, as I hear it from you guys.  Can these other unions, 
like the steelworkers’ union or the electricians’ unions, just 
arbitrarily say, “Hey, guys, we only want people in our union who 
 
 281 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 
F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 395–96. 
 284 See id. 
 285 See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. XVII, § 2. 
 286 Id., art. XXXVIII, § 6. 
 287 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385. 
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are twenty-five to forty-five?”  Has an exclusion based solely on 
age like this ever been challenged before this decision and upheld? 
PROF. MOYER: Anybody up here know the answer to that? 
MR. GANZ: Well, there are age discrimination laws that 
would obviously apply to unions that restrict their membership.288  
Many states, New York included, have age discrimination laws 
that apply starting at age eighteen.289  So that’s a separate question. 
I have never seen a case like that, but theoretically a union 
could unilaterally adopt a requirement for membership in the 
union.  If it didn’t violate some age discrimination law or anything 
like that, it would be perfectly fine. 
PROF. ROBERTS: The typical union is not going to have an 
interest in making those age distinctions.  Sports are unique 
because the players need to reach a certain level of physical 
maturity before they are likely to be successful—so age becomes a 
relevant issue.290  It’s not a relevant issue in most bargaining units, 
at least at some point.  I mean, obviously the Army won’t take you 
until you are seventeen.291  There are probably other situations. 
QUESTIONER: What you just described makes age the key 
issue.  Is the physical ability why age might be irrelevant in some 
of these other unions but relevant in sports?  Because this guy is 
obviously great.292  I mean, he did great things.293 
PROF. ROBERTS: I was obviously a great lawyer after my 
first year of law school, but they wouldn’t let me practice.  I mean 
the point is you sometimes 
 
 288 See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 130–45 (McKinney 2004). 
 289 See id. §§ 132–38. 
 290 See Easterblogg, supra note 129 (arguing that “[p]erformance in team sports requires 
maturity, which in this context usually means the early twenties”). 
 291 See Enlist in the US Army, at http://www.army.com/enlist (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) 
(providing that people must be between the ages of 17–34 to enlist). 
 292 For example, during the 2002 season when his team, the Ohio State Buckeyes, won 
the National Championship, Clarett was the team’s leading rusher with over 1200 yards 
and 16 rushing touchdowns. See Ohio State Clubhouse, Team Statistics, at 
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QUESTION: But that wasn’t based solely on age.  You had to 
go two more years and then pass the bar. 
PROF. ROBERTS: But when you’re talking about playing 
sports, age and physical maturity are relevant.294  And yes, there 
may be an occasional exception, just like there’s an occasional 
exception of somebody who could practice law before they get 
their law degree.295  But we have to set minimum entry 
requirements into various professions.296 
The question is: Is this an appropriate restriction?  Sure, there 
are always going to be exceptions to any rule that you adopt.  But 
can you adopt a general rule even though it might unfairly impact a 
tiny number of people?  To me that’s not an antitrust question. 
MR. FEHER: In some ways I think the press hasn’t focused on 
what I think is the more radical conclusion of this decision, which 
is that the union and management can’t agree on it.297  In some 
ways, people have been treating Clarett as being either the end of 
the world or the best thing. 
It involves some terribly important antitrust and labor law 
issues.298  But so long as unions and management have the capacity 
to work it out, in most cases they will and it won’t be such a big 
deal.  But the real difficult problem here, I think, is Judge 
Scheindlin’s finding that you cannot do it.299 
I’m not saying that the current appeal isn’t important, because 
it is terribly important, in part because of these antitrust and labor 
law issues.  But so long as there is a determination that the union 
and management can work these things out, I think in most cases it 
will happen. 
PROF. ROBERTS: David, would you at least agree that if in 
fact the NFL proposed to the union that they’re going to have a 
three-year-out-of-high-school rule and they bargain to impasse and 
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the NFL unilaterally implements it, that the Brown300 decision 
would protect that as well, even though the union hasn’t agreed to 
it? 
MR. FEHER: I agree it would be a different factual 
circumstance than what we’ve got here. 
MR. CORNWELL: The answer is yes. 
MR. ROBERTS: I know you don’t like the Brown decision. 
PROF. MOYER: Gentlemen, on that inconclusive yet 
interesting note, we thank the audience for your attention and the 
panel for its input. 
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